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Experimental and theoretical models of cultural evolution 
 
Marius Kempe 
 
Abstract: 
 This thesis contributes to the field of cultural evolution by presenting two 
experimental and two theoretical models of cultural evolution. Prior to presenting 
these I survey existing experimental and theoretical models of cultural evolution. In 
the first experiment, I test the hypothesis that increasing group size speeds up cultural 
accumulation, using a novel puzzle-solving task and within a transmission chain 
design. I find support for this hypothesis, in contrast with previous experiments. In the 
second experiment, also using a transmission chain design, I examine perceptual 
errors in recreating Acheulean handaxes and ask whether such errors can account for 
the variability of Acheulean technology over time. Using the accumulated copying 
error model to compare the experimental data to archaeological records, I conclude 
that perceptual errors alone were likely not the driving force behind Acheulean 
evolution. In the first theoretical chapter, I present models of cultural differences 
between populations and of cumulative culture, which build on existing models and 
accord with empirical data. I then show that the models, when combined, have two 
qualitative regimes which may correspond to human and nonhuman culture. In the 
second theoretical chapter, I present a ‘fundamental theorem of cultural selection’, an 
equivalent of Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection for cultural 
evolution. I discuss how this theorem formalizes and sheds light on cultural 
evolutionary theory. Finally I conclude and discuss future research directions. 
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Introduction 
 
The topic of this thesis is experimental and theoretical models of cultural evolution. 
Cultural evolution here refers to the theory that culture – which, in this field, is 
defined as information transmitted via social learning, although very different 
definitions are and have been used in other parts of anthropology – evolves in a 
broadly Darwinian way: that is, by a process of variation, inheritance, and 
competition, which leads to selection on cultural traits (Mesoudi et al., 2004). This 
process leads to the phenomenon of cumulative culture, in which the utility of 
complexity of individual cultural traits increases over time, such as in human science 
and technology and such that no one individual could invent them in their lifetime 
(Boyd  & Richerson, 1996; Tomasello, 1993). It is this capacity for cumulative 
cultural evolution that, arguably, has allowed our species to successfully colonize and 
inhabit virtually every terrestrial environment on the planet in a relatively short period 
of time (Richerson & Boyd, 2004; Hill et al., 2009). 
 
The study of cultural evolution is now over three decades old. A good number of both 
experimental and theoretical models have been constructed and analysed, to which 
this thesis contributes four novel models. The aim of the thesis is to contribute to our 
understanding of cultural evolution, both empirical and theoretical, by using some of 
the specific techniques of the field, including ‘transmission chain’ experiments, 
mathematical models, and computer simulations. The previous results of studies using 
these methodologies will be surveyed in the first chapter. 
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The first chapter comprises a selective literature review of previous models of cultural 
evolution. It is divided into two parts, which survey previous work relating to two 
questions: 
1. How are cultural traits changed during their transmission? 
2. What social learning strategies do individuals use and what are the population-level 
consequences of those strategies? 
These two questions provide a framework and launching pad to discuss developments 
both old and recent in the field. 
 
Thereafter follow two experimental and two theoretical chapters. In Chapter 2, I 
describe an experiment seeking to understand the link between demography and 
cumulative culture, which has been the subject of both previous models and 
experiments. I present a novel experimental task in which participants solve jigsaw-
puzzles, which I argue has several advantages over previous tasks. Using this task, I 
show that the hypothesized positive effect of the size of a cultural group on the rate of 
cultural accumulation can occur in an experimental situation, as predicted by previous 
models but contrary to previous experiments. 
 
In Chapter 3, I describe an experiment which tests a particular mathematical model of 
cultural evolution in Acheulean handaxes. This technology was prevalent for over a 
million years in hominin evolution and had extraordinary stability in form over this 
time. Using a novel iPad-based experiment in which participants manipulated a virtual 
handaxe image with their hands, I tested the Accumulated Copying Error model, in 
which cultural evolution takes place solely through cultural mutation due to 
perceptual errors. After analyzing the model, fitting our experimental data to it, and 
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comparing the result with archaeological records, I conclude that cultural mutation 
cannot have been the only process at work in Acheulean evolution. 
 
In Chapter 4, I construct and analyse two theoretical models: one of cultural 
differences and one of cumulative culture. Here ‘cultural differences’ refers to the 
phenomenon that multiple populations of one species show distinct ‘profiles’ of 
cultural traits, which, while a hallmark of human culture, has also been observed in 
non-human species such as chimpanzees and orangutans. I show that such distinct 
profiles can be maintained even in the case of repeated innovation and frequent 
migration. In the model of cumulative culture I show that that both the number of 
cultural models and the accuracy of social learning affect the degree to which trait 
complexity increases. I note that both models fit available empirical data (on the 
differences in great ape populations and the degree of complexity of human Oceanic 
fishing technology). I then combine the models, showing that the combined model, 
which incorporates both cultural differences and cumulative culture, has two 
qualitative regimes which seem to correspond with human and nonhuman culture. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 5 I take inspiration from R. A. Fisher’s ‘Fundamental Theorem of 
Natural Selection’ to construct a similar ‘fundamental theorem of cultural selection’. 
This theorem provides a precise mathematical expression of the process of cultural 
selection in a general way. I derive and explain the theorem and argue that it allows a 
unifying perspective on a number of cultural evolutionary forces that have been 
hitherto considered separately, including content, model, and frequency-dependent 
biases, natural selection, and cultural group selection.  
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Chapter 1. 
Experimental and theoretical models of cultural evolution: a review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A revised version of this chapter was accepted at WIRE Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Cognitive Science.  
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Abstract: 
The field of cultural evolution is now over thirty years old, and a good deal of 
work has been done. This paper reviews models of cultural evolution, both 
experimental and theoretical, and surveys what they can tell us about cultural 
evolutionary processes. The models are grouped into two categories, according to 
which of two broad questions they address: (i) How are cultural traits changed during 
transmission?, and (ii) What social learning strategies do organisms use and what are 
their population-level consequences? The review is selective, not exhaustive, and 
attempts to survey both the most important works and recent developments. 
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1.1. Overview 
Cultural evolution is now a field with over thirty years of history. The main principle 
of this field is that culture evolves in a Darwinian manner – that is, through a process 
of natural selection on cultural traits. Culture, in this usage, is taken to be mean any 
information that is transmitted from individual to individual via social learning 
(Mesoudi et al., 2004). To be clear, the kind of natural selection that is posited to act 
on culture does not necessarily rely on biological fitness, but rather constitutes a 
separate cultural evolutionary process which may be called 'cultural selection'. 
 
The argument for this idea is relatively straight-forward. Cultural traits, such as 
technological inventions, languages and linguistic features, religious and social 
customs, and so on, clearly vary (amongst each other), reproduce (from individual to 
individual), and compete (for memory or adoption). For example, there are around 
6800 languages in the world, and approximately 5 million distinct patents have been 
issued in the US since its founding (Mesoudi et al., 2004). Languages are clearly 
learnt socially, while patents build on and cite earlier patents. Finally, competition 
takes place between cultural traits within these system, such as the replacement of 
many irregular verbs with regular verbs in English since medieval times (Lieberman 
et al., 2007) and the replacement of certain stone tools with other types in the 
archaeological record (O’Brien & Lyman, 2000). Thus, there is every reason to think 
that a process of natural selection will take place amongst them, which to distinguish 
it from the process of natural selection on biological organisms (i.e. through genetic 
reproduction) is often called cultural selection. A detailed appraisal of the evidence 
for this argument can be found in Mesoudi et al. (2004). 
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The idea that natural selection acts on culture is in fact rather old; for example, 
Darwin mentions it in The Descent of Man (1871). Since then a large number of other 
scholars in many fields have discussed this idea: famous examples include James 
(1880), Campbell (1965), Dawkins (1976), Popper (1979), Skinner (1981), Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman (1981), Boyd & Richerson (1985), Hull (1988), and Dennett 
(1995). The true beginning of the field, however, may be taken to be the books by 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) and Boyd & Richerson (1985), which were the first 
to develop this idea in a thorough, quantitative way. Since then a good deal of detailed 
work has been done, which has recently been surveyed accessibly by Mesoudi 
(2011a). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the more specialised literature of models, both 
experimental and theoretical, which has accumulated since the founding books of 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman and Boyd & Richerson. The advantage of modelling is that 
it can shed light on complex phenomena and produce insights by simplifying 
inessential features. Experiments can model situations observed in real life, while 
allowing controlled designs and detailed data recording. Mathematical models provide 
a way of running formal ‘thought-experiments’, by analyzing the consequences of a 
certain set of assumptions that are thought to hold in the real world, and provide a 
level of precision that is unattainable through purely verbal models. Thus modelling, 
which has greater internal validity (that is, internal consistency and logical 
coherence), is an important complement to observational research such as 
ethnographic field studies, historical and archaeological research, and statistical data 
mining, which have greater external validity (that is, direct relation to the phenomena 
being studied) .  
 16 
 
The review will be selective, rather than exhaustive, as the literature after thirty years 
is extensive. The review will also focus exclusively on cultural evolution, rather than 
the interaction of cultural and biological evolution – itself an important and large 
topic with a varied literature known more specifically as gene-culture coevolution 
(see Durham 1991; Laland 2008). The review will also be exclusively focused on 
humans, excluding the large and diverse literature on social learning in non-human 
animals. 
 
The review is structured around two important questions in cultural evolution: 
1. How are cultural traits changed during their transmission? 
2. What social learning strategies do individuals use and what are the population-level 
consequences of those strategies? 
 
1.2. How are cultural traits changed during transmission? 
This question encompasses two sub-questions which I will separate for the purposes 
of discussion. First I will discuss how cultural traits change during transmission 
generally, for example through the actions of remembering and perceiving. Second, I 
will discuss how cultural traits increase or decrease in utility during transmission, 
leading to the phenomenon of cumulative culture. 
 
It is well known that traits change simply through the process of learning, or copying, 
on the part of a naive individual. This process was first studied experimentally by 
Bartlett (1932), who pioneered the 'transmission chain' method. In this method, one 
individual is seeded with a cultural trait of some kind – for instance, a story or a 
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picture – and then this individual transmits the trait in some way to a second 
individual, who in turn transmits the trait to a third, and so on. The method can also be 
varied to have more than one individual in each link of the 'chain', so that a group of 
individuals in some way transmit a trait to another group of individuals. Finally, in 
this group setting, the 'turnover' of the chain can be altered so that instead of the entire 
group changing at every step, only one individual is replaced in the group by a new 
individual; this is known as the 'replacement' method and was first proposed by 
Gerard et al. (1956). The bulk of experiments pertaining to cultural evolution have 
been conducted with the transmission chain method and its variants (Mesoudi & 
Whiten, 2008). 
 
A large number of specific traits have been investigated with these methods, and 
different questions have been asked. The studies of Bartlett and his school (e.g. 
Maxwell, 1936; Northway, 1936; Ward, 1949; Hall, 1950) tended to use stories and 
drawings, and to frame open-ended research questions: what patterns could be found 
in the changes to the traits as they were passed along the chain? Secondarily, they 
asked how characteristics of the subject – for example, their cultural background or 
social status – may have affected the changes seen in the traits. Specific hypotheses 
did not tend to be tested, and the general conclusion was that traits tended to lose 
detail and resemble preconceived notions of the individuals as they were transmitted. 
For example, in one of Bartlett’s (1932) experiments, an American Indian story called 
the ‘War of the Ghosts’ was passed through a transmission chain made up of British 
participants, with the result that details such as the names of the warriors were lost, 
and unfamiliar elements such as the American Indian notion that something black 
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came out of a dying warrior’s mouth were transformed into the more familiar Judao-
Christian idea that his soul was leaving his body.  
 
However, the focus of these studies was on human psychology – memory – and not 
on cultural traits and their evolution. More recent studies have reapproached this 
method with a view to understanding the details of cultural evolution. Thus, for 
example, Mesoudi et al. (2006) found that social information in stories was 
transmitted more accurately and lost less frequently than non-social information, in 
line with ‘social brain’ theories that posit that human cognition evolved primarily to 
deal with social information. Bangerter (2000) found that gender stereotypes were 
superimposed on descriptions of scientific phenomena, with initially neutral 
descriptions of conception gradually transformed such that sperm cells were 
increasingly attributed active agency and ova increasingly attributed passive non-
agency. Many similar experiments now give us a reasonable, detailed understanding 
of the variation in traits caused by the process of transmission, comprehensively 
reviewed in Mesoudi & Whiten (2008). These variations constitute examples of what 
is called ‘cultural mutation’ by some (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981) in the 
literature.  
 
Researchers have also attempted to model these processes of change through 
transmission mathematically. The leading methodology here is the 'Bayesian' 
approach exemplified by Kalish et al. (2007), Smith (2011), and Xu et al. (2013). In 
this approach individuals are thought of as possessing 'prior', innate or learned, biases 
for certain characteristics of cultural traits (e.g. simplicity or learnability). They then 
observe 'data' from another individual composed of samples from a distribution of 
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traits with varying characteristics. The models suppose that individuals combine these 
two sources of information using Bayes' theorem and create a 'posterior' distribution 
of trait characteristics which they present in turn to the next individual. This approach 
has had remarkable success in producing predictions qualitatively in accord with 
experimental results, even in experiments not originally designed to test the models 
(e.g. Beppu & Griffiths, 2009, who created a Bayesian model which recreated the 
experimental results found by Jacobs & Campbell, 1961; their results are discussed 
below). Because of its focus on the details of cognition and its predictive success, it 
represents one of the most promising approaches for future research devoted to 
elucidating the details of cultural transmission. 
 
While all of the afore-mentioned studies were carried out in a laboratory situation 
with a carefully controlled experimental design, an important recent development has 
been the use of an 'open diffusion' method by Whiten & Flynn (2010) and McGuigan 
& Cubillo (2013), in which the individuals with whom the new trait or information is 
seeded are allowed to freely interact with a social group and the transmission of the 
trait is observed. This technique allows researchers to document previously 
unobservable features of cultural transmission, such as who chooses to observe what 
and whom; for example, McGuigan & Cubillo (2013) found that male children were 
more likely to transmit gossip than female children, and that both sexes were more 
likely to transmit gossip than surprising factual information. The downside of this 
method is of course that experimental control and some precision is lost. Despite this, 
it represents another promising avenue of research for the future. 
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The second sub-question, namely how cultural traits accumulate over time, has a 
shorter history. Cumulative culture, as discussed above, refers to traits such as the 
startling technological, scientific, artistic, and social achievements of humanity, which 
are distinguished from the cultural traits of other animals by their reliance on earlier, 
less developed traits (Mesoudi et al., 2004). Experimental work on cumulative culture 
using the transmission chain method was initiated by Caldwell & Millen (2008). In 
their experiments, individuals perform a technological task with a clear goal and 
measure of success, such as constructing a paper airplane to fly as far as possible or 
building a tower using spaghetti and clay as high as possible. Each participant 
completes this task as best they can, after which successive individuals in the chain 
are faced with the same task but are able to observe the previous individual's solution. 
The focus in these experiments is generally less on the nature of the cognitive 
processes involved in the task, and more on the degree to which successive 
individuals are able to improve on their predecessor's solution, and the conditions 
which exacerbate or attenuate this improvement. 
 
Caldwell & Millen (2008) found that the quality of solutions did improve as the 
designs were transmitted through a chain, indicative of cumulative cultural change. In 
further studies Caldwell & Millen (2009) addressed whether particular mechanisms of 
social learning - imitation, emulation, or teaching - are necessary for cumulative 
cultural change. Imitation involves copying behaviours (here, the motor actions 
required to make the paper airplane), emulation involves copying end-products (here, 
the finished airplane design), while teaching involves the transmission of explicit 
advice (here, advice about how to make the paper airplane). They found that, for this 
task, each of these three mechanisms were sufficient alone, in contrast to previous 
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claims that only imitation and teaching (and not emulation) are necessary for 
cumulative culture (Heyes 1994). Caldwell & Millen (2010), meanwhile, found that 
allowing individuals to observe more than one model simultaneously does not 
increase the rate or degree of accumulation. 
 
This last result is intriguing because several mathematical models of cultural 
accumulation have focused on the relationship between population size and the rate 
and degree of cultural accumulation. That population size is an important factor in 
technological evolution in particular is suggested by both apparent links between 
increases in population sizes in the Upper Paleolithic and the concurrent appearance 
of so-called 'modern human behaviour' (including complex stone tools, decorations, 
cave art, and musical instruments) (Shennan 2001; Powell et al. 2009), and by the 
drastic loss of technologies in Tasmania after the area became an island circa 10,000 
years ago and therefore was cut off from neighbouring Australia (Henrich 2004). 
These observations led Shennan (2001), Henrich (2004), and Powell et al. (2009) to 
construct models in which increases or decreases in population size led to increases or 
decreases in the rate and/or degree of cultural accumulation in the population. This 
effect occurs because in larger populations complex skills are less likely to be lost due 
to random transmission error, and rare beneficial modifications are more likely to be 
made, as there are more people to make them. More recent models have added several 
realistic features: Mesoudi (2011b) showed that an increasing cost of learning more, 
and more complicated, traits would produce realistic S-shaped curves in the degree of 
complexity of over time, which had not previously been found. Finally, Pradhan et al. 
(2012) considered the effect of varying levels of interaction between members of the 
population, aiming specifically to explain the greater quantity of technologies found 
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in chimpanzee populations compared to orangutan populations, and showed that this 
could be caused by the greater sociability of chimpanzees. 
 
While chimpanzee populations may have more cultural traits than orangutans, neither 
species, nor any other nonhuman primate species, appears to exhibit cumulative 
culture. The social and cognitive factors that may be responsible for this difference 
have also been explored experimentally. Dean et al. (2012) had groups of capuchins, 
chimpanzees and children solve a three-stage puzzle box to obtain rewards, with each 
solution predicated on the previous one(s). The children significantly outperformed 
the monkeys and chimpanzees on this minimally cumulative task, with verbal 
communication, imitation, and prosociality predicting the greater success in children. 
It is likely, therefore, that both socio-cognitive (e.g. imitation fidelity) and social 
demographic (e.g. population size/density) underlie the species differences in 
cumulative culture, an issue that is addressed in Chapters 2 and 4 below. 
 
More recently two experimental studies have revisited the hypothesis that cultural 
accumulation is facilitated by larger population sizes. Derex et al. (2013) found that 
simple (arrowheads) and complex (fishing nets) computer-designed traits were 
maintained only in larger groups of 8 or 16 participants, and not in smaller groups of 
2 or 4 participants. Muthukrishna et al. (2014) found that complex symbol designs 
and difficult-to-tie knots were only maintained in transmission chains comprising five 
participants per generation, and not chains composed of a single participant in each 
chain. The negative finding of Caldwell & Millen (2010), therefore, may have been 
due to the particular task that they used, which may not benefit from social learning as 
much as the tasks employed in these subsequent studies. 
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1.3. What social learning strategies do individuals use and what are their population-
level consequences? 
Like the previous question, this question naturally divides into two subquestions: the 
first concerns what social learning strategies we empirically observe organisms using, 
and the second the theoretical population-level consequences of these strategies. 
'Social learning strategies' here refers to the innate or learned rules which people use 
in social learning (Laland 2004): rules specifying, for instance, what or from whom to 
learn; an equivalent term is ‘transmission biases’. The use of the term ‘bias’ here is 
intended in a statistical sense, as indicating a deviation from ‘unbiased’, or 
undirected/random social transmission (rather than the normative sense of, say, ‘racial 
bias’). While there has been a good deal of theoretical work investigating what social 
learning strategies natural selection may favour (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 
Kendal et al., 2009a), in the end there is clearly only one way to definitively establish 
what social learning strategies people use: empirical observation and experiment. 
Accordingly the first part of this section will focus on experimental work while the 
second section, dealing with the population-level consequences of given social 
learning strategies, will focus on mathematical models, which allow such questions to 
be answered with suitable generality. 
 
Here I will focus more on strategies that concern from whom and what to copy, and 
less on strategies concerning when to copy (e.g. depending on life-history variables: 
for a review, see Kendal et al., 2009b). This focus is appropriate because 'who' and 
'what' questions are more directly relevant to understanding the population-level 
consequences of social learning strategies, which is one of the primary aims of 
cultural evolutionary theory. For the same reason, cultural evolutionary research is 
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generally less concerned with the specific mechanism by which social learning takes 
place, such as imitation, emulation, teaching, social enhancement, and so on - as long 
as there is some mechanism to provide relatively faithful transmission, who and what 
is copied is more important at the population level than how it is copied - and for this 
reason the majority of research in social psychology (e.g. Bandura, 1977) and 
comparative psychology (Whiten et al. 2004) is only tangentially relevant to the intent 
of this review. 
 
Social learning strategies relevant to cultural evolution can be divided into three 
categories using a convenient classification system due to Richerson & Boyd (2005): 
namely, as falling into one of three kinds of biases, either 'content', 'model', or 
'frequency-dependent'. Content biases refer to strategies in which individuals choose a 
particular trait over others because of innate or learned preferences for the actual 
content of that trait, be it meaning, usefulness, or aesthetics. Model biases refer to 
strategies in which individuals adopt traits because of a characteristic of the person 
from whom they learn the trait: for example, adopting a trait from prestigious or 
generally successful individuals. Finally, frequency-dependent biases refer to 
strategies in which individuals take up a trait because of the trait’s relative popularity, 
or unpopularity, compared to other traits in their population; examples of this include 
conformity, which (in cultural evolution, but not in the broader field of psychology) is 
defined as adopting the most popular trait in a population with a probability greater 
than its proportion of occurrence in the population, and anti-conformity, where the 
least popular trait is adopted with a probability greater than its proportion of 
occurrence. 
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While some authors have described the transmission chain studies discussed in the 
previous section as furnishing examples of content biases (e.g. Mesoudi, 2009), in my 
view content bias differs from cultural 'mutation', or from the memorability of a 
cultural trait by the fact that individuals choose the relevant trait in some fashion. 
Using this definition, there has been unfortunately little work on content biases, as in 
transmission chain studies participants generally do not have a choice between 
different cultural traits. One of the few studies is that of Wisdom et al. (2013), in 
which participants had to find the highest-scoring combination of ‘items’ in a virtual 
environment in which they could view other participants’ items and scores. They 
found that content bias was an important element in participants’ social learning 
strategies, with participants copying the highest-scoring items in addition to deploying 
model- and frequency-dependent biases. Further studies explicitly examining content 
biases in an experimental setting are clearly needed. 
 
There have been more studies examining model biases. A number of early studies 
found strong effects of perceived expertise or status on people's judgements in 
domains such as aesthetic judgements (Mausner, 1953), visual perceptions (Mausner, 
1954), gambling (Rosenbaum & Tucher, 1962), and attitudes (Ryckman et al., 1972). 
There has also been work specifically focused on children's learning, since a great 
deal of what we know is learned as children, with a number of studies finding that 
children preferentially copy from older rather than younger models (Brody & 
Stoneman, 1981; Abramovich & Grusec, 1978; Jaswal & Neely, 2006). In an 
innovative experiment Wood et al. (2012) recently found that children were biased 
more towards older models than self-professedly knowledgeable ones where these 
characteristics conflicted. Using adult participants, Mesoudi (2011c) conducted a 
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study in which participants constructed virtual (computer-based) projectile points to 
conduct virtual hunts (with variable rewards) and were able, during multiple rounds, 
to view and possibly copy other individuals' points. This experiment found evidence 
for the presence of success bias but noted that the presence of the bias was 
heterogenous: rather than all individuals using it, some individuals used it very often 
and others barely at all (note that this was success rather than content bias, as the 
participants were not aware of the utility of specific virtual projectile points). Using a 
similar paradigm, Atkisson et al. (2012) found that individuals were more biased 
towards model characteristics, specifically the prestige of a model as indexed by the 
amount of time that other participants were said to have looked at the model’s 
arrowhead designs, than trait characteristics, i.e. the effectiveness of the arrowhead. 
 
Finally, a number of studies have examined frequency-dependent biases, primarily 
conformism. The famous early studies of Sherif (1936) and Asch (1952), which 
convincingly demonstrated that people may sometimes adopt the opinions of the 
majority, do not qualify as conformity under the cultural-evolutionary definition 
because it is not possible to tell whether people adopt the majority view with greater 
than proportionate probability. Jacobs & Campbell (1961) used Sherif's auto-kinetic 
task with the replacement method, described above, starting with confederates and 
ending with naive participants; they found that the conformity to exaggerated majority 
judgements was rapidly overwhelmed by people's trust in their individual perceptions. 
Thus, theirs was the first study to examine conformity from the cultural-evolutionary 
point of view and using the cultural-evolutionary definition. More recently, a series of 
experiments by McElreath et al. (2005; 2008) and Efferson et al. (2008) utilised a 
virtual 'farming' task in which participants choose to 'harvest' one of two crops. Each 
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crop had a stochastic payoff, and the optimal crop changed from time to time. Using 
variations on this design and model-fitting techniques, McElreath et al. (2005; 2008) 
concluded that individuals use a complex mix of payoff-biased and conformist 
learning, while Efferson et al. found individual differences, with some individuals 
using the conformity strategy and others ignoring frequency information. Finally, an 
experiment by Efferson et al. (2007) using a variation on this design with Bolivian 
pastoralists found little evidence for either conformism or payoff-bias; this experiment 
is remarkable for its unusual (compared to other studies) participant group, an 
important step towards drawing conclusions valid for the entire human species (see 
also the general survey by Henrich et al. (2010)). 
 
What, then, are the population-level consequences of given social learning strategies? 
This question has been addressed through mathematical modelling since the books of 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) and Boyd & Richerson (1985) and thus represents 
probably the most studied aspect of cultural evolution. The mathematical tools used to 
address this question are those relating to dynamical systems, both deterministic and 
stochastic, with the majority of models falling into the class of Markov chains (i.e. 
processes that evolve probabilistically in a way that depends only on their current 
state), usually analysed in discrete time-steps for ease of analysis. 
 
Like in evolutionary biology (e.g. Kimura, 1984), cultural evolutionary researchers 
have realised the usefulness of constructing explicit neutral models in which 
individuals learn traits entirely 'at random', without the use of any particular social 
learning strategies or biases. Also like in evolutionary biology, there are a number of 
ways of conceptualising 'at random'. A series of 'random copying' models developed 
 28 
by Bentley et al. (2004; 2007) assumes that individuals copy the trait of a random 
member of their population, finding that the resulting distribution of trait frequencies 
will follow a power law (that is, a distribution in which the most popular traits 
account for the majority of all traits, with successively less popular traits accounting 
for smaller and smaller proportions of all traits), and noting similar distributions in 
traits such as the frequencies of baby names and dog breeds. However, the statistical 
methods used in these papers to assess the fit of empirical evidence to the predictions 
of the models are unreliable (for a survey of this issue, see Clauset et al. (2009)). 
Later, Eriksson et al. (2010) proved 'Bentley's conjecture' that the rate of turnover in 
this model is almost independent of the size of the population. Strimling et al. (2009b) 
also have developed a variant of the model in which individuals may fail to learn a 
trait with some probability. Alternatively, Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) modelled 
the 'random drift' of continuous, rather than discrete, traits, characterising the rate at 
which populations would vary if each individual made a slight (additive) error during 
the learning process. 
 
The effects of specific biases can be seen against the background of the expectations 
generated by neutral models. Initial models of content, model, and frequency-
dependent biases were analysed by Boyd & Richerson (1985), partly with a view 
toward understanding their biological consequences. In particular, they found that 
conformist frequency-dependent bias leads to within-group homogeneity but between-
group heterogeneity, a common phenomenon in humans (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). 
They also identified the possibility of ‘runaway’ co-evolution between model 
preferences and trait values, which may explain exaggerated phenomena such as 
whole-body tattoos in certain societies. More recently, Strimling et al. (2009a) 
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investigated the dynamics of content bias when the 'fitness' of a trait is partitioned into 
two components, 'diffusion' and 'retention', finding that the number of opportunities 
for learning was crucial in determining the evolutionary outcome, with traits with 
high ‘retention’ dominating only when individuals had a large number of 
opportunities for learning. Baldini (2013) investigated model biases, such as success- 
or prestige-bias, comparing the dynamics of strategies in which individuals averaged 
the success of all individuals with a certain trait with strategies in which individuals 
imitated the single most successful individual. He found that although there were 
many situations in which each strategy performed better than random copying, there 
were some situations in which each was worse than random copying: for the 
averaging strategy, this occurred when the optimal trait had high frequency in the 
population, and for the most-successful strategy when an on average suboptimal trait 
had a high variance in its outcomes. Mesoudi & Lycett (2009) investigated the effect 
of conformist and anti-conformist frequency-dependent biases on the distribution of 
trait frequencies, showing that conformity leads to distributions in which a small 
number of traits dominate others in frequency, and anti-conformity to distributions in 
which traits of intermediate frequency are favoured, both of which noticeably deviate 
from the power-law distribution noted above to result from random (unbiased) 
copying. Such models are very useful for understanding the detailed dynamics of 
cultural evolution. 
 
These models lead to quantitative predictions and, conversely, allow inference from 
statistical data regarding a variety of traits. Researchers have also constructed and 
analysed models specific to certain classes of traits. Starting from Boyd & Richerson 
(1982; 1985), there has been a vibrant literature showing how human cooperative 
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tendencies may have arisen through a process of 'cultural group selection', i.e. group 
selection on groups differentiated by cultural traits (such as would be created by 
conformist bias, as noted above), and more recently researchers have applied the tools 
of evolutionary game theory to modelling cultural traits in situations where the utility 
of a certain trait depends on the traits adopted by other individuals, of which 
cooperation is a primary example (Boyd & Richerson, 2002; Peyton Young, 2011). 
Another set of processes of biological importance that have inspired cultural 
evolutionary models are the Neolithic and Industrial demographic transitions, where 
researchers have modelled the effects of technological and social change (e.g. the 
spread of contraception) on population sizes and compositions, both as individual 
traits (Fogarty et al., 2013) and in combination with other mediating traits (Ihara & 
Feldman, 2004; Borenstein et al., 2006). Thus cultural evolutionary models provide 
both general explanatory schemes for cultural change and specific explanations for 
important biological and social phenomena. 
 
1.4. Discussion 
Cultural evolution is now a burgeoning field, and much has been achieved. Much also 
remains to be done, and the preceding review suggests several obvious directions for 
future research. In general, there can never be too much replication, integration 
between theoretical and experimental studies, ecological validity in experiments, and 
realism in theories. The creation of detailed models of cognition, such as the Bayesian 
models noted above, which can be validated experimentally represents a fruitful line 
of research which currently has only been applied to relatively low-level cognitive 
processes. With respect to cumulative culture, it is still unclear exactly what cognitive 
and social factors allow humans but not other species to accumulate beneficial 
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cultural traits over time. The investigation of human social learning strategies and 
biases has shown that individuals show a good deal of heterogeneity in the biases they 
deploy, and that real life social learning strategies tend to be complicated and 
composed of mixtures of simple strategies; future experiments may investigate these 
complexities. Theoretical models have led to a detailed understanding of cultural 
evolutionary dynamics, and future research should attempt to base modelling 
assumptions on empirically validated observations and describe the interplay between 
multiple, interlocking biases and processes. 
 
This thesis contributes to these aims in the following ways. In the second chapter, I 
describe an experiment investigating the effect of population size on cultural 
accumulation using a novel puzzle-making task. The third chapter constructs an 
explicit model for trait changes during transmission due to perceptual errors based on 
psychophysical principles, and tests this model experimentally with respect to 
Acheulean handaxe technology. The fourth chapter presents two models which extend 
previous theoretical investigations by incorporating multiple populations and linearly 
dependent cumulative traits, relating these models to empirical data on great apes and 
humans, and investigates how the models may shed light on the unique features of 
human culture. Finally, the fifth chapter investigates the possibility of giving a precise 
mathematical formulation to the concept of 'cultural selection', which thus far has 
been used in divergent ways in the literature, in a way analogous to R.A. Fisher's 
'Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection' in evolutionary biology, and therefore 
imposing some conceptual order on the various theoretical processes of cultural 
evolution. 
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Chapter 2. 
An experimental demonstration of the effect of group size on cultural accumulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter was submitted to Evolution and Human Behaviour, where it received a 
‘revise-and-resubmit’. 
 
 
 
This chapter was co-authored with Alex Mesoudi.
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Abstract: 
 Cumulative culture is thought to have played a major role in hominin 
evolution, and so an understanding of the factors that affect cultural accumulation is 
important for understanding human evolution. One such factor that has been proposed 
is population size, with larger population sizes thought to be able to support more 
complex cultural traits. This hypothesis is supported by mathematical modelling and 
empirical studies of small-scale societies. However, to date there have been few 
experimental demonstration of this effect. Here we provide such a demonstration 
using a novel task, solving jigsaw puzzles. 80 participants divided into ten 
transmission chains solved puzzles in one of two conditions: individuals or groups of 
three. The mean number of pieces solved increased over time in the group condition, 
but not in the individual condition. Thus, our experiment provides support for the 
population size hypothesis and gives a demonstration of a factor underpinning 
complex cumulative culture. 
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2.1. Introduction 
 Cultural evolution is likely to have played a crucial role in hominin evolution. 
Examples of this include the spread of cooking and tool-use in earlier hominin species 
(Carmody & Wrangham, 2009; Foley & Lahr, 2003), and agriculture and writing in 
our own (Goody & Watt, 1963; O'Brien & Laland, 2012). Moreover, while social 
learning and cultural differences between populations are common in several non-
human species (Galef & Laland, 2005), cumulative culture, defined as cultural traits 
that are dependent on other cultural traits (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Enquist et al., 
2011), may be unique to hominins (e.g. Dean et al., 2012). Cumulative culture is often 
characterised by the presence of traits that are too complex to have been invented by a 
single individual, instead having accumulated over multiple generations (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1996; Tomasello et al., 1993). Such traits are ubiquitous in human 
domains such as technology, science, and mathematics (Basalla, 1988; Hodgkin, 
2005; Longair, 2003), and clearly played a crucial role in our current ecological 
success. Thus, an understanding of the factors that help or hinder the emergence of 
cumulative culture is important for understanding hominin evolution. 
 
 One factor that has been proposed to be related to the emergence and 
maintenance of cumulative culture is population size. In an influential paper, Henrich 
(2004) constructed a mathematical model providing a potential mechanism by which 
population size partly determines the cultural complexity attainable by that 
population. In Henrich’s model, a population of a given size reproduces in discrete 
generations, and in each generation every adult member of the population acquires a 
cultural trait which can be more or less functional, the functionality being measured 
quantitatively. For example, the trait could be a bow-and-arrow, and its functional 
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measurement how far it shoots, or the trait could be a stone handaxe and its functional 
measurement how sharp it is. Each individual acquires the trait by copying the single 
individual in the previous generation with the most functional (i.e. 'best') version of 
the trait. However, they copy this individual imperfectly, so that most individuals 
make copying errors and acquire a version of the trait that is worse than that of their 
model, and a few individuals innovate successfully and acquire a version of the trait 
that is better than that of their model. This imperfect copying process is assumed to be 
random, so that each individual acquires a trait of different quality compared to other 
individuals.  
 
Henrich (2004) showed that, given these assumptions, a population of a given 
size can maintain the transmission of a trait only up to a given functional level, or 
'complexity'. Versions of the trait with greater complexity than the stable level will 
tend through transmission to get worse, and versions with lesser complexity than the 
stable level to improve, until the stable level is reached. This stable level increases 
with the size of the population, because the more individuals there are, the greater is 
the chance that large gains in functionality will occur through innovation and be 
copied by the next generation. In essence, more innovation takes place in larger 
populations. The stable level is of course determined by other factors in addition to 
the size of the population, most importantly its inherent complexity and difficulty to 
learn. Henrich’s model has been extended by Powell et al. (2009; see also Shennan 
2001) to look at population density and migration between sub-populations; by 
Mesoudi (2011a) to include the cost of acquiring more complex knowledge; and by 
Kobayashi & Aoki (2012) to the case of overlapping rather than discrete generations. 
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Empirical support for the link between population size and cultural 
accumulation is mixed. Henrich (2004) himself used his model to explain the loss of 
various technologies (e.g. complex bone tools, spears, boomerangs, fire-making) in 
Tasmania after rising seas cut it off from Australia approximately 11,000 years ago, 
thereby creating a smaller sub-population. Powell et al. (2009) used their extended 
model to explain the emergence of 'modern human behavior' (e.g. symbolic artefacts, 
complex tools, musical instruments) during the Pleistocene, noting that human 
population density in Africa, Europe and the Middle East was, according to estimates 
made using population genetic data and theory, similar at the times when these 
behaviours emerged. Four studies have investigated the relationship between 
population sizes of hunter-gathering and food-producing societies on the size and 
complexity of their toolkits. Collard et al. (2005) did not find a relationship in a 
sample of 20 hunter-gatherer populations mainly from North America; Kline & Boyd 
(2010) did find a relationship with both toolkit size and complexity among 10 
Oceanic island populations; Collard et al. (2011) also did find a relationship with both 
toolkit size and complexity among 45 food-producing societies from around the 
world, but not among a similar sample of 34 hunter-gathering societies; and finally, 
Collard et al. (2013) similarly found a relationship with both toolkit size and 
complexity among 40 food-producing societies from around the world. At greater 
time depths, Lycett & von Cramon-Taubadel (2008) showed that Acheulean handaxe 
diversity fitted the predictions of a serial founder effect model, i.e. diversity decreased 
with predicted decreasing population size as early hominins migrated from an African 
origin (see also Lycett & Norton 2010). Thus, there is clearly some empirical support 
for a link between population size and cultural accumulation. 
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 However, Henrich’s (2004) model provides not only a population-level 
prediction – that cultural complexity should be dependent on population size – but 
also an individual-level mechanism underpinning that prediction. Regarding the latter, 
a crucial aspect of Henrich’s model is that new, unknowledgeable individuals acquire 
their cultural knowledge from a single individual of the previous generation, and that 
this individual has the highest cultural complexity of their generation (i.e. individuals 
employ success-biased oblique cultural transmission). Under this mechanism, the 
population-size effect therefore works because larger populations are more likely, by 
chance, to contain highly successful individuals who are copied by the subsequent 
generation. While the assumption of success-biased cultural transmission is a 
reasonable one (see, for example, McElreath et al. 2008; Mesoudi, 2008, 2011c), 
learning from just a single individual may be less plausible. Indeed, Enquist et al. 
(2010) found analytically that cultural transmission from multiple individuals is more 
likely to maintain knowledge in a population than learning from a single individual, 
albeit in a non-cumulative cultural system. One might expect that learning from 
multiple skilled individuals, and combining their knowledge in each generation, 
would be at least as effective a mechanism for maintaining and accumulating complex 
cultural knowledge than relying on just the most-skilled individual, particularly when 
such knowledge can be easily combined. Under this alternative mechanism, then, the 
population-size effect outlined by Henrich (2004) would still occur, but would occur 
instead because in larger populations, there are more models available from whom 
knowledge can be additively combined. 
 
 While archaeological and paleoanthropological studies of the kind described 
above can address the general prediction of cultural-demographic models (a positive 
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relationship between population size and cultural complexity), they cannot test the 
validity of the underlying mechanism responsible for this effect, given that we cannot 
directly observe cultural transmission dynamics in long-dead populations (e.g. 
whether people typically copied one or more individuals, or whether they copied 
successful individuals). As such, even though there is general support for the link 
between population size and cultural complexity, this may not necessarily be through 
the mechanism assumed in existing models. To probe such mechanisms, laboratory 
experiments are needed, in which cultural transmission dynamics can be directly 
observed and factors can be isolated and their effects precisely measured (Mesoudi & 
Whiten, 2008).  
 
 To date, three studies have experimentally tested the link between population 
size and cultural accumulation. Caldwell & Millen (2010) asked participants to build 
paper airplanes that would fly as far as possible, with participants observing either 
one, two, or three previous participants building their paper airplanes as well as those 
participants’ completed airplanes. They did not find that the distance the airplanes 
flew increased more rapidly or to a higher level as the number of models increased. 
Derex et al. (2013) had groups of 2, 4, 8 or 16 participants design computer-generated 
arrowheads (a simple trait) and fishing nets (a complex trait), allowing participants to 
copy the design of one other participant given information about other participants’ 
success. Derex et al. found that only in the two larger groups (8 and 16) were the 
simple designs improved, and the complex designs maintained, over successive 
generations. Finally, Muthukrishna et al. (2014) had chains of participants - either one 
per generation or five per generation - draw a symbol using a complex graphics 
software package, or tie a complicated knot. Written instructions, final products 
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and/or videotaped behaviour were transmitted between generations. As predicted, the 
symbols drawn by chains of five participants increased in complexity due to 
increasingly effective instructions compared to the chains of single participants, and 
the knots tied by chains of five participants were more likely to be maintained than 
the knots tied by the chains of single participants. 
 
 Derex et al. (2013) and Muthukrishna et al. (2014) therefore provide support 
for the overall prediction that cultural complexity is more likely to be maintained and 
accumulated in larger groups, although Caldwell & Millen (2010) found no effect. 
Regarding the mechanism, both Derex et al. (2013) and Muthukrishna et al. (2014) 
found that Henrich’s (2004) assumption of success-biased transmission from a single 
model is a plausible means by which the population-size effect works. However, none 
of these studies provided a proper test of the alternative mechanism outlined above, 
where information is integrated from multiple sources. Derex et al. (2013) only 
allowed participants to learn from a single person at a time, given information about 
other participants’ relative success. Muthukrishna et al. (2014) allowed the five-per-
generation participants to view the solutions of all five previous participants 
simultaneously, potentially allowing the integration of multiple participants’ 
knowledge, but in practice participants predominantly copied the single most 
successful participant of those five. Caldwell & Millen’s (2010) participants could 
also view two or three models simultaneously, but the task used, building paper 
airplanes, was not conducive to integrating information across models because 
different airplane designs may be incompatible. That is, combining elements of two 
different designs may sometimes lead to a better design, but often to an even worse 
design. The tasks used by Derex et al. and Muthukrishna et al. - making fishing nets 
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and tying knots - similarly have solutions that are difficult to combine. Interestingly, a 
recent study by Eriksson & Coultas (2012), looking at the cultural transmission of 
written texts, found that more information was preserved during transmission when 
each generation had access to two previous participants’ recall, compared to one 
previous participant’s recall. While not designed as a test of cultural accumulation or 
the cultural-demographic models reviewed above, Eriksson & Coultas’ study provides 
some support for the notion that having access to multiple cultural models can at least 
maintain information in a population better than having access to just a single model. 
 
 Our aim in this study is to explicitly test the population size hypothesis for 
cultural accumulation along the lines of previous experimental studies, but with a task 
– completing jigsaw puzzles – in which observations from multiple models can be 
easily combined into one solution. We compare transmission chains composed of a 
single individual per generation with chains composed of three individuals per 
generation, with the latter able to see the partially-completed puzzles of all three 
members of the previous generation simultaneously. If our prediction is upheld – that 
the three-participants-per-generation chains are more likely to accumulate knowledge 
(in the form of proportion of the puzzle completed) than the one-participant-per-
generation chains – then this would suggest an additional mechanism by which 
population size influences cultural complexity to the one-parent success-biased 
cultural transmission currently assumed by population-demographic models and 
tested in previous experiments. 
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2.2. Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
80 unpaid participants, undergraduate students at the Universities of Durham 
and Exeter, took part as part of their undergraduate courses. Ethical permission for the 
experiment was given by the Research Ethics and Data Protection Committee, 
Department of Anthropology, Durham University, and all participants read and signed 
informed consent forms. 
  
2.2.2 Task and design 
The experimental task was to complete a jigsaw puzzle. The puzzle had 100 
pieces and measured 33.5cm by 45cm; the puzzle picture can be seen in Fig. 2.1. 
Participants were divided into 10 transmission chains, 5 in each of two conditions: 
individuals and groups of three (Figure 2.2). Each transmission chain had four non-
overlapping generations. Each participant was asked to complete as much of the 
puzzle as possible in 12 minutes, starting from scratch. (The written instructions were: 
‘You have 12 minutes to complete a jigsaw puzzle. Complete as much as you can.’). 
Participants were not given a photo of the completed puzzle to help them; however, in 
generations after the first, participants were able to see the partially-completed 
puzzles created by the participants in the generation before them. In the group 
condition, each of the three participants in one generation sat next to each other, but 
were divided by screens that obscured each others’ puzzles, and they did not interact 
in any way. Before being presented to successive generations, all loose single pieces 
were removed from partially-completed puzzles, but the physical layout of completed 
pieces was not altered or standardised. 
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Figure 2.1. The painting on the jigsaw puzzle. Image by John Francis; used with the kind 
permission of the copyright holder, Gibsons Games. 
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Figure 2.2. An illustration of the experimental design. There were 5 replicate chains in each 
condition, giving 10 chains in all. 
 
 The outcome measure for each participant was the number of puzzle pieces 
that they correctly connected to at least one other puzzle piece. Sets of completed 
puzzle pieces did not need to form one large set to be counted; multiple small sets of 
completed pieces contributed in the same way to the outcome measure. In the group 
condition, we also measured the number of distinct puzzle pieces correctly connected 
to at least one other puzzle piece across all three puzzles completed by the participants 
in each generation. This gives a measure of the amount of information about the 
puzzle that the succeeding generation was able to observe, accounting for the 
duplication of completed pieces across different observed puzzles. 
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2.3. Results 
 The results of the experiment can be seen in Fig. 2.3. It is visually evident that 
the mean number of pieces completed trends upward in the group condition but not in 
the individual condition. To test this hypothesis statistically, we used Page's (1963) 
trend test, which tests for a hypothesised ordered monotonic trend (in this case, an 
increasing trend) in the means of a number of different treatments (which are 
generations in this case). The test was non-significant (L5,4 = 123, p > 0.05, n = 20) for 
the individual condition, and significant (L5,4 = 141, p = 0.01, n = 20) for the group 
condition. We also compared the means of the first and last generations in each 
condition using Welch’s two-sample t-test: for the individual condition there was no 
significant change in the number of puzzle pieces connected (t6.1 = 0.2422, p = 
0.5917, one-sided, n = 10), while for the group condition there was (t23.2 = -2.2882, p 
= 0.0158, one-sided, n = 30), with more pieces connected by the final than first 
generation. 
 
As can be seen on Fig 2.3a, the last generation contained outliers in both one group 
condition chain and one individual condition chain, and to ensure the robustness of 
the trend we also applied Page’s trend test to the data with these outliers replaced by 
the mean value of the other chains in the respective conditions in the last generation. 
The test was again non-significant (L5,4 = 128.5, p > 0.05, n = 20) for the individual 
condition, and significant (L5,4 = 137, p < 0.05, n = 20) for the group condition. 
 
 
 45 
 
Figure 2.3. The results of the experiment. (A) The number of pieces completed in each 
individual chain in both conditions. Each datapoint for the group condition shows the mean 
number of completed pieces across the three participants in that group. The full dataset is 
available in Appendix A. (B) Mean number of pieces completed in each condition. The error 
bars show standard errors. 
 
 The number of distinct pieces completed in the three puzzles of each group is 
shown in Fig. 2.4. As with the mean number of pieces completed, this appears to 
trend upwards, and indeed Page's trend test showed a significant increasing trend (L5,4 
= 139, p < 0.05, n = 20). 
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Figure 2.4. The number of distinct pieces completed in the group condition. (A) Number of 
distinct pieces completed in each chain. The full dataset is available in Appendix B. (B) Mean 
number of pieces completed. Error bars show standard errors. 
 
2.4. Discussion 
Our experiment showed no increasing trend in the mean number of jigsaw pieces 
completed in the individual condition, when each generation of the transmission 
chains was a single individual, but a significant increasing trend in the group 
condition, when each generation consisted of three individuals. The larger number of 
individuals is clearly able to maintain the transmission of a greater amount of 
information about the puzzle. Thus, the results of the experiment support the proposed 
link between population size and cultural accumulation put forward by Shennan 
(2001), Henrich (2004), Powell et al. (2009) and others. 
  
 The upward trend in the number of distinct pieces completed across a group 
shown in Fig. 2.4 suggests that participants were integrating information from 
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multiple models, as predicted. This therefore provides an alternative mechanism by 
which the population-size effect operates, in addition to the success-biased cultural 
transmission from a single demonstrator assumed in previous models (e.g. Henrich 
2004) and tested in previous experiments (e.g. Derex et al., 2013). Our finding 
supports recent modelling (Enquist et al., 2010) and experimental (Eriksson & 
Coultas, 2012) work showing the benefits of multiple cultural parents on cultural 
transmission, although extended here to a cumulative cultural context. 
 
 It is instructive to compare our results with those of Caldwell & Millen (2010), 
who found no effect of group size despite similar group sizes and generations. As 
discussed in the Introduction, different tasks will be more or less conducive to cultural 
accumulation. In our jigsaw puzzle task it is easy to combine information from 
multiple different puzzles completed by members of a previous generation into one’s 
own puzzle. By contrast, information about multiple different paper airplane designs 
may conflict, and combining multiple designs may lead to a worse design than any of 
the models. While copying the single airplane design of the most successful 
individual may be effective in larger groups or over more generations than were 
employed by Caldwell & Millen, the fact that we observed accumulation with similar 
group sizes and generations suggests that combining knowledge from multiple 
cultural sources can be an equally potent mechanism for cultural accumulation 
compared to copying a single successful individual, given the appropriate task. 
   
 Our experiment shows that the characteristics of the task are important in 
determining the extent to which population size will affect its cultural accumulation, 
and future modelling work on the relationship between population size and 
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cumulative culture should take into account not only factors extrinsic to the task but 
also factors intrinsic to it. One way of conceptualizing task differences is by 
considering uni-modal vs. multi-modal utility, or ‘fitness’, landscapes (see Mesoudi 
2008; Mesoudi & O’Brien 2008a,b). The task of finishing a jigsaw puzzle constitutes 
a unimodal, single-peaked utility landscape, because the more pieces a participant has 
completed, the closer to completion they are; in our experiment, it did not matter 
which particular combination of, say, 40 pieces was completed, so long as the number 
was 40. However, the task of building paper airplanes may create a multimodal, 
multi-peaked utility landscape, in which there are multiple locally optimal designs 
that can solve the task relatively well (though there may be a single globally optimal 
design). These multiple designs may be rather distinct from each other, and designs 
which mix features of two or more ‘good’ designs may fall into a utility valley and be 
relatively inefficient at solving the task. 
 
It may be that there is a continuum along which real-world technologies can 
be placed, from simple utility landscapes with one peak to complex utility landscapes 
with very many distinct peaks of quite unequal height. An engineering correlate of 
this continuum may be the extent to which the technology consists of independent vs. 
interdependent parts. Moreover, these differences may occur at different levels of 
granularity. For example, complex post-Industrial Revolution technologies such as 
cars and computers incorporate large numbers of different parts, which must work 
together in order for the technology to function. However, if a certain part is required 
for a specific task, it may not matter exactly how it achieves that task, and so the 
overall functioning of the technology (e.g. car) may be relatively independent of the 
exact mechanism in which the constituent part fulfills its function (see Arthur, 2009). 
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Another example of such hierarchical structure is found in modern computer software, 
which is often written using ‘object-oriented’ and ‘functional’ techniques in which the 
external behavior of various system sub-parts is highly constrained but the internal 
implementation of these sub-parts is relatively unconstrained (Mitchell, 2002). 
 
Future experiments and empirical work may provide more evidence on what 
tasks are particularly conducive to the build-up of cumulative culture, the way in 
which independence and interdependence of technological sub-components affects 
technological accumulation, and allow us to ‘measure’ the fitness landscape of a 
given task. A promising path may be to use experimental tasks with direct ecological 
validity to a specific domain, such as mathematics, tool-use, or construction, unlike 
the tasks used here and in other recent experiments, which require little specialist 
knowledge. Such experiments may help to show whether certain domains are more 
amenable to cultural accumulation than others. Another path may be to examine the 
contribution of collaboration, which was not possible in our experiment, to 
cumulative culture. More refined experimental designs would allow this factor to be 
isolated, comparing in effect the ‘between-generation’ and ‘within-generation’ 
components of cultural accumulation. Experimental work such as this can then be 
used to inform historical, anthropological and archaeological data, to make specific 
predictions regarding which kinds of cultural traits are most likely to have been 
impacted by demography, and thus provide substantial insight into human biological 
and cultural evolution. 
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Chapter 3. 
An experimental test of the accumulated copying error model of cultural mutation for 
Acheulean handaxe size 
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Abstract: 
Archaeologists interested in explaining changes in artifact morphology over 
long time periods have found it useful to create models in which the only source of 
change is random and unintentional copying error, or ‘cultural mutation’. These 
models can be used as null hypotheses against which to detect non-random processes 
such as cultural selection or biased transmission. One proposed cultural mutation 
model is the accumulated copying error model, where individuals attempt to copy the 
size of another individual’s artifact exactly but make small random errors due to 
physiological limits on the accuracy of their perception. Here, we first derive the 
model within an explicit mathematical framework, generating the predictions that 
multiple independently-evolving artifact chains should diverge over time such that 
their between-chain variance increases while the mean artifact size remains constant. 
We then present the first experimental test of this model in which 200 participants, 
split into 20 transmission chains, were asked to faithfully copy the size of the previous 
participant’s handaxe image on an iPad. The experimental findings supported the 
model’s prediction that between-chain variance should increase over time and did so 
in a manner quantitatively in line with the model. However, when the initial size of 
the image that the participants resized was larger than the size of the image they were 
copying, subjects tended to increase the size of the image, resulting in the mean size 
increasing rather than staying constant. This suggests that items of material culture 
formed by reductive versus additive processes may mutate differently when 
individuals attempt to replicate faithfully the size of previously-produced artifacts. 
Finally, we show that a dataset of 2601 Acheulean handaxes shows less variation than 
predicted given our empirically measured copying error variance, suggesting that 
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other processes counteracted the variation in handaxe size generated by perceptual 
cultural mutation. 
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3.1. Introduction 
The idea that human culture – defined here as socially transmitted information such as 
beliefs, knowledge, skills, artifact designs, and customs – constitutes an evolutionary 
process was hinted at by Darwin himself in The Descent of Man, where he suggested 
that languages evolve over time in a manner analogous to the diversification and 
extinction of biological species (Darwin, 1871). This notion of cultural evolution was 
explored further throughout the twentieth century by archaeologists (Binford, 1963; 
Clarke, 1968), anthropologists (Sahlins & Service, 1960; Schwartz & Mead, 1961) 
and psychologists (Gerard et al., 1956; Campbell, 1975), but it was not until the work 
of Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) and Boyd & Richerson (1985) in the 1980s that 
the implications of the parallels between biological and cultural change were more 
rigorously explored using the same quantitative mathematical modelling techniques 
that population geneticists use to successfully model and understand biological 
evolution (see Mesoudi, 2011a esp. chap. 3). Our focus here is on the application of 
these cultural evolutionary methods and concepts to archaeology (O’Brien & Lyman, 
2002; Shennan, 2011), which can be seen as the ‘cultural equivalent’ of paleobiology 
in its aims to document and explain past evolutionary change (Mesoudi et al., 2006). 
This has included the use of phylogenetic methods to reconstruct historical 
relationships between artifacts (O’Brien et al., 2001), the use of models originally 
developed in population genetics, such as serial founder effect and neutral drift 
models, to explore the effects of demography on artifact variation (Lycett, 2008; 
Lycett & von Cramon-Taubadel, 2008; Neiman, 1995; Shennan & Wilkinson, 2001; 
Bentley & Shennan, 2003; Bentley et al., 2004; Kohler et al., 2004; Schauer, 2009; 
Steele et al., 2010; Brantingham & Perreault, 2010), and the explanation of artifact 
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variation in terms of cultural transmission biases such as prestige bias or conformity 
(Kohler et al., 2004; Bettinger & Eerkens, 1999). 
 
Another important process of cultural evolution that may have fruitful application in 
archaeology is cultural mutation. By analogy to genetic mutation, this describes the 
process in which ideas are involuntarily changed when they are transmitted from one 
person to another. In this study we present the first explicit experimental simulation of 
a model of cultural mutation in archaeology. Specifically, we are interested in testing 
the accumulated copying error (ACE) model proposed by Eerkens & Lipo (2005), in 
which random error in a quantitative artifact dimension (e.g. size or thickness) is 
generated by the physiological limitations of the hominin perceptual system. Eerkens 
& Lipo drew on experimental findings from psychophysics which showed that the 
accuracy of human perception has physiological limits, especially our ability to 
perceive differences between objects (Coren et al., 1994). If the difference in size 
between two objects is below some threshold, then this size difference will tend to be 
imperceptible to the naked human eye, and this will become more and more likely as 
the size difference between the objects grows smaller. Such error thresholds are 
always relative to the size of the object, rather than absolute. For example, two lines 
that are less than 3% different in length are typically perceived as identical, with this 
3% value known as the Weber fraction for this particular dimension (line length). 
Eerkens & Lipo applied this basic principle of psychophysics to the repeated cultural 
transmission of artifacts. They assumed that when attempting to copy the morphology 
of an artifact as faithfully as possible, and in the absence of formal measurement aids 
(e.g. rulers), the manufacturer is likely to make small copying errors that are 
imperceptible to them due to the aforementioned perception thresholds. If that 
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person’s copied artifact is in turn copied by another person, and so on along a 
transmission chain, then copying errors will compound over time, possibly creating 
significant morphological change compared to the original artifact. Moreover, if 
multiple such transmission chains evolve independently, then the variation between 
these diverging chains is likely to become substantial and to increase over time. Note 
that this process will take place regardless of whether any other cultural evolutionary 
forces are at work, and thus, it may be useful to incorporate this model of mutation in 
other, more complicated models. 
 
Eerkens & Lipo presented a simple simulation model of this process in which a 
continuous trait value is transmitted over successive generations of individuals with a 
3% random normal error rate, and with 10 independently evolving chains. Their 
simulation showed that, as expected, the independent chains diverged over time as 
some became larger and others became smaller. Due to the randomness of the error, 
the overall mean value did not change over time, while the between-chain variation 
did increase over time. They then applied these expectations to two case studies, 
showing that the thickness of Owens Valley projectile points increases in variation in 
a way consistent with the random accumulated copying error model, while the basal 
width of those points, and the vessel diameter and thickness of Late Woodland pots, 
show less variation than expected, suggesting that some non-mutation process (e.g. 
conformist transmission) may have been at work in these latter cases. 
 
Our aim here is to provide an explicit experimental test of Eerkens & Lipo’s ACE 
model of artifact transmission. Although the assumptions of their model are based on 
previous experimental findings from psychophysics (Gilinsky, 1951), from where 
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their 3% copying error assumption is derived, it is unclear (i) whether this 3% error 
threshold is uniform across a large population of individuals, or whether there is inter-
individual variation in this threshold value (especially given previous findings of 
substantial individual variability in some perceptual psychometric functions: Coello & 
Garriga, 1991; Engeland & Dawson, 1974), and thus how any inter-individual 
variation affects the robustness of the model; (ii) whether this 3% threshold, originally 
obtained for simple lines or abstract geometric shapes, also applies to more realistic 
artifact shapes; and (iii) whether it is valid to simply extrapolate a single individual’s 
perceptual error along successive transmission episodes, or whether there are 
unexpected dynamics introduced by the compounding of individual errors (Hamilton 
& Buchanan, 2009, for example, argued that the compounding of errors causes the 
size of artifacts in chains to decrease, on average).  
 
To address these issues, we asked multiple chains of participants to copy an artifact 
image as faithfully as they could, in a direct replication of Eerkens & Lipo’s model. In 
addition, in order to provide an explicit model within which to insert our 
experimentally-derived copying-error parameter, we also derive two formal 
mathematical predictions of the model which allow us to test the assumptions of the 
model with our data. Although this is the first experimental test of a cultural mutation 
model of artifactual evolution, it adds to a handful of other studies that have 
experimentally simulated cultural transmission dynamics in the archaeological record 
(e.g. Mesoudi & O’Brien, 2008).  
 
Although the findings of our experimental simulation, like Eerkens & Lipo’s original 
model, are in principle applicable to any culturally transmitted artifact, we take a 
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particular interest here in the question of size variation in Acheulean handaxes. 
Acheulean handaxes were used by various hominin species from at least 1.76 million 
years ago (Lepre et al., 2011) to at most 0.14-0.12 million years ago (Haslam et al., 
2011), and were thus used longer than all other known hominin tools apart from 
Oldowan artifacts (Gowlett, 2011). They were used in Africa, Europe, and Asia, and 
their temporal span witnessed the evolution of several new hominin species (Clark, 
1994; Klein, 2009). Given this extended temporal and geographic spread, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that patterned variation within this technocomplex has been detected in 
statistical analyses of handaxe shape (e.g. Lycett & Gowlett, 2008). However, it has 
also been argued that certain patterns of stability in handaxe form and size (at least 
within certain bounds) over this temporo-geographic spread might reflect culturally 
selective constraints for functional or social reasons (Kohn & Mithen, 1999; Vaughan, 
2001; Gowlett, 2006; Gowlett, 2009). Applying and testing explicit models of 
evolution by cultural mutation will allow us to investigate the question of handaxe 
size in a rigorous way, and provide a base for future explicit models of their cultural 
selection (e.g. for functional or social purposes). As chimpanzee visual acuity is 
similar to modern human visual acuity (Matsuzawa, 1990), it is likely that hominin 
species would have had similar visual acuity to our modern human participants, and 
thus that our measured parameters will be similar to those of fossil hominins. Thus, 
knowledge of the parameters can be used to derive predictions about the amount of 
variation generated during the temporal span of Acheulean handaxes that we should 
expect to find in the archaeological record under the ACE model, and thereby connect 
our microevolutionary experiment to documented macroevolutionary patterns. We 
therefore use a handaxe image as our ‘experimental artifact’ in the present study, and 
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in the Discussion we ask whether the experimentally-informed ACE model can 
account for observed patterns of Acheulean evolution. 
 
3.2. Methods 
3.2.1. Model 
The ACE model postulates that each chain consists of a number of generations, each 
of which has one member. In each generation, the sole member copies some 
continuously-valued attribute of the artifact of the sole member of the previous 
generation, introducing a randomly determined quantity of copying error. As we 
expect each member to have a similarly-shaped distribution of copying errors, the 
Central Limit Theorem justifies modelling the random determination of copying error 
as drawing a random deviate from some normal distribution. The famous 
psychophysical finding of Weber's Law, namely, that perceptual errors scale 
proportionally to the magnitude of the attribute of the object being perceived, rather 
than being fixed, absolute quantities, justifies multiplying the previous generation's 
value by the randomly sampled copying error, rather than adding the copying error to 
the previous generation's value. 
Thus, we write: 
, 
where  is the value at generation ,  is the starting value of the process, and 
 are i.i.d. random variables equal to . We are interested in the 
moments of , so that we can compare empirical measurements of summary statistics 
with the model’s predictions. Since  is simply , and the error variables are 
both independent and identically distributed, we can see that: 
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, 
so the expectation of  is always equal to its starting value. As for the variance: 
 
 
. 
We can find  by noting that: 
 
, 
and thus , allowing us to find the variance: 
. 
Both of these moments are the moments of a random variable that represents an 
individual chain, and are therefore unobservable; however, we can estimate them by 
measuring the mean and sample variance of multiple independently evolving chains, 
expecting that the mean will stay constant over time and the sample variance will 
increase without bound. 10 such chains, evolving for 400 generations, are shown in 
Figure 3.1A, along with their predicted mean and variance. This partially recreates the 
results of Eerkens & Lipo (2005). While our analysis confirms that the mean should 
not change over time, our results suggest that the variance should increase 
exponentially, rather than plateau. However, when  is small (e.g., within the typical 
range for human copying error distributions) then both our and their equations give 
very similar predictions for the variance. 
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Figure 3.1. Simulations of the ACE model. (A) 10 chains evolving over 400 generations 
(black lines) and theoretically predicted mean (thick black line) and variance (thick dashed 
line). (B) 200 chains evolving over 1000 generations, with individual chains represented by 
semi-transparent grey lines so that multiple overlapping lines produce darker colors. The thick 
black line shows the mean of all chains. In both panels,  and . 
 
We also note that our model and results deviate slightly from a more recent ACE 
model presented by Hamilton & Buchanan (2009). They found that, in contrast to 
both Eerkens & Lipo and ourselves, accumulated copying error causes the mean to 
become smaller. They argued that this is because, given that copying error is relative 
to the size of the object being transmitted, chains with artifacts that happen to get 
smaller will also have smaller copying error, making them less likely to deviate 
further and more likely to remain small. In contrast, chains with artifacts that happen 
to get larger will have larger copying error, increasing the probability that they will 
eventually produce smaller objects over time. Our results, however, suggests that this 
is not the case: while it is true that most chains of artifacts get smaller because small 
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chains of artifacts stay small, pushing the mean down, this is counterbalanced by a 
minority of chains of artifacts that get much larger. Because copying error is relative, 
those large chains get exponentially large. In other words, small chains of artifacts 
stay small, and most chains of artifacts become small, but large chains of artifacts get 
much, much larger, with the overall mean not changing. This can be seen in Figure 
3.1B, which shows the value of most chains of artifacts drifting smaller than the 
starting value, a few chains of artifacts drifting to extremely high values, but the mean 
of all chains of artifacts staying basically constant through time. The difference 
between these results may be due to Hamilton & Buchanan’s use of log values, which 
will reduce the effect of these very large values. 
 
Note that one obvious objection to the above analysis is that normal distributions can 
take on any value, including negative values, and thus that the resulting values of  
can be negative, which is nonsensical in many interpretations, e.g. if  represents size 
or weight. This is a valid objection in general, but as human perceptual error 
distributions tend to have very low variance - for example, as we show later, in our 
data  - it makes negligible difference for cultural drift models. For instance, 
substituting a truncated normal distribution bounded below at 0 with  into 
the equations above gives , an astronomically small difference that 
would not affect predicted means and variances even after millions of generations. 
 
3.2.2. Experiment 
In our experiment, we wish to (1) estimate , the variance of the distribution of 
copying errors, and (2) test whether the mean and sample variance of multiple 
independently evolving chains in an experimental setting match their expected values. 
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Ideally, we would do this by running multiple transmission chains in which 
participants would be asked to create a new Acheulean handaxe by faithfully copying 
the previous participant's handaxe. However, Acheulean stone knapping is both 
dangerous and difficult (Whittaker, 1994; Edwards, 2001), and finding enough 
participants who would be both willing and able to knap handaxes would be a 
challenge. Thus, we settled on a compromise that allowed us to simulate the essential 
features of the model: an electronic, touch-screen-based resizing task. Using an iPad, 
each participant in each transmission chain was shown the previous participant's 
handaxe and asked to resize a second handaxe to match the size of the previous 
participant's as closely as possible (Figure 3.2). This resizing was done using a 
pinching gesture with two fingers on the iPad screen, and as much time was given as 
needed; thus, we feel justified in assuming that manufacturing error, as opposed to 
perceptual error, was not a significant factor in the results of the experiment. It should 
be emphasized that our transmission-chain experiment thus focuses solely on the 
ability of participants to replicate the attribute of artifact size, to the exclusion of 
shape attributes. 
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Figure 3.2. The main screen of the iPad-based experiment. The handaxe image on the left was 
created by the previous participant, and the current participant is asked to resize the handaxe 
image on the right so as to match the size of the previous participant's as closely as possible. 
Participants pressed the tick mark to complete the experiment. 
 
In our experiment, then, the continuous value modelled as  in our model is the size 
of the handaxe, with height and width scaled isometrically. As the right-hand handaxe 
image (the one that is to be resized by the participant) must begin at some arbitrary 
size, we ran two conditions of the experiment: one in which the right-hand image 
began at the maximum possible size (i.e. with the same height as the screen, 14.4 cm), 
and one in which it began at 1/3 the size of the screen (4.8 cm height). The zeroth-
generation left-hand side handaxe image in each transmission chain was set at 10 cm 
height (i.e., ), and the width of all images was always 7/15 of their height. 
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We ran 10 transmission chains with 10 participants each in both conditions. All 
participants were distinct, i.e., no participant took part in more than one chain or more 
than once within a chain. Participants were recruited primarily by soliciting in the 
library of Queen Mary, University of London. 59.5% were female and 75.5% were 
within 18 and 25 years of age. Those participants who wore corrective eyeglasses or 
contact lenses were allowed to keep them on for the experiment. 
 
3.2.3. Ethics statement 
The study was approved by the Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee. All 
participants viewed an informed consent screen and agreed to it by tapping an 
electronic button; this procedure was approved by the Research Ethics Committee. All 
data was analyzed anonymously, and sex and age information was deleted after 
calculating summary statistics across the whole sample. 
 
3.3. Results 
Our full results dataset is available in Appendix C. Our first aim was to estimate . 
Figure 3.3 shows normal probability plots (in which a straight diagonal line at y = x 
indicates perfect fit to a normal distribution) for the distribution of empirically 
measured copying errors in each condition. For each transmission event, copying 
error is measured by the final size of the right hand image divided by the size of the 
left hand image. As can be seen, they appear normal; in order to formally test this 
hypothesis, we used the Anderson-Darling normality test, which did not reject 
normality for either distribution (larger-axe condition: A = 0.53; p = 0.17; smaller-axe 
condition: A = 0.44; p = 0.29). Having established the condition’s normality, we can 
estimate  by measuring the sample standard deviation (we report the sample 
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standard deviation here rather than the sample variance to avoid reporting very small 
numbers, and also because standard deviations are easier to interpret, being measured 
in physical units rather than units squared), which was 0.0269 for the larger-axe 
condition and 0.0399 for the smaller-axe condition, with an overall mean of 0.0343. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Normal probability plots of empirically measured copying errors. Data from the 
condition with the larger initial size of handaxe image is red and from condition with the 
smaller initial size of handaxe image. 
 
Our second aim was to test the two predictions of the model. Figure 3.4 shows the 
empirically measured sizes, means, and variances of the chains over time, and their fit 
to the predicted values calculated according to the equations derived above. As 
 depends on , the empirically measured values of  for each condition 
were substituted into the expression in order to calculate the predicted variances 
plotted in Figure 3.4B. As can be seen, the measured means do not seem to fit the 
predicted mean well, but the measured variances do seem to fit the predicted 
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variances. In order to formally test these hypotheses, we simulated the process 
described by the theoretical model, substituting in the empirically measured variances 
for each condition's distribution of copying errors, and matching the conditions of our 
experiment (i.e. 10 chains of 10 generations each in each condition). This was done 
with R (R Core Development Team, 2012) using code given in Appendix D. We 
derived empirical p-values by measuring the proportion of times that a value equal to 
or more extreme, in the appropriate direction, than the measured final mean and 
variance in each condition occurred over 10,000 simulations. For the larger-axe 
condition, the proportion of simulations where the final mean was equal to or more 
extreme than the empirically measured final mean was 0.01, and the proportion where 
the final variance was equal to or more extreme than the measured final variance was 
0.44; for the smaller-axe condition, these values were 0.22 and 0.42 repectively. Thus, 
our visual intuitions are partly vindicated: the final mean in the larger-axe condition 
does deviate from the predicted mean more than expected by chance at the 5% 
significance level, but the final mean in the smaller-axe condition does not, while the 
final variances in both conditions do indeed not deviate from the predicted variances 
more than expected by chance at this significance level. 
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Figure 3.4. Results of the experiment compared to theoretical predictions. (A) Empirically 
measured sizes in each chain (thin dotted lines) and means across all chains in each condition 
(heavy solid lines) in both conditions. Data from the larger-axe condition is plotted in red and 
data from the smaller-axe condition in blue. The dashed black line shows the theoretically 
predicted mean. (B) Empirically measured variances across all chains in each condition (solid 
lines) and theoretically predicted variances (dashed lines) derived by using the empirically 
measured variance of the copying error distribution in each condition. Data and predictions 
from the larger-axe condition are plotted in red and from the smaller-axe condition in blue. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to provide the first explicit experimental test of the 
accumulated copying error model of cultural transmission, in which artifact variation 
increases due to imperceptible differences between a copy of an artifact and the 
original copied artifact. Acheulean handaxe images were transmitted along 20 
independent chains each containing 10 participants, allowing us to measure inter-
individual variation in copying error ( ) which has previously only been assumed 
from the psychophysics literature, in which transmission error and artifact evolution 
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are not the focus of study. We find that the ACE model gives good predictions of 
between-chain variance over time (see Figure 3.4B): in both the model and the 
experiment, between-chain variation increases exponentially over time as copying 
error causes different chains to diverge. Moreover, the empirically determined 
estimate of  of 0.0343 resembles quite closely the copying error assumed in 
previous models of 3% (Eerkens & Lipo, 2005) which was derived from the 
psychophysics literature. This supports the use of this assumption in a cultural 
transmission context. 
 
However, the empirical between-chain mean did not follow the predicted mean in the 
‘larger’ condition, in which the initial size of the participants’ handaxe was larger than 
the target handaxe. It is also suggestive that in the ‘smaller’ condition, in which the 
participants’ handaxe started smaller, the measured between-chain means trended 
below the predicted mean, although the difference between the measured final mean 
and simulated final means was not significant at the 5% level. It will require more 
experimental testing to establish whether these biasing effects of the initial size of the 
object to be resized on its final size are not an artifact of using an iPad. If they are 
valid effects, they will have interesting implications for predicting ACE in 
archaeological data, as we would be led to expect that the size of artifacts created by 
‘additive’ production methods (e.g. the weaving of baskets) as opposed to ‘reductive’ 
production processes (e.g. the manufacture of flaked stone tools) would evolve 
differently, with the size of additively-produced artifacts decreasing slowly through 
time and the size of the reductively-produced artifacts increasing, at least in instances 
where there is an effort to replicate faithfully the size of previously produced objects.  
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As the experiment shows that the model gives good predictions of between-chain 
variance, and we have estimated the shape parameter of the distribution of copying 
errors, we are now able to examine whether the model explains known data about the 
evolution of Acheulean handaxes. Happily, there exists a large database of 
morphological measurements on Acheulean handaxes, the Acheulean Biface Database 
(Marshall et al., 2002), against which we can test the model. The database includes 
length and breadth measurements for 2601 complete handaxes from 21 different sites 
in 5 countries (Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, Israel, United Kingdom), with an 
age range of 1.5-0.3 million years ago. The coefficients of variation for length and 
breadth in this sample are 0.30 and 0.23, respectively. As deriving an expression for 
the coefficient of variation of all the artifacts created by a large number of 
independent chains over time is analytically difficult, we used simulations to estimate 
this quantity. The simulations were programmed in R using the general form cv (c 
(replicate (100, cumprod (rnorm ( , 1, ))))). Setting  to our measured value of 
0.0343, we find that the ACE model will generate  values greater than 0.30 in less 
than 200 generations, implying an obviously unrealistic lifespan of 4000 years for 
Acheulean handaxes (assuming a generation time of 20 years). Alternatively, we can 
set  to 60,000, corresponding to 1.2 million years of evolution, the age range of the 
dataset, if each generation lasts 20 years, which shows that  must be approximately 
0.0017, or 20 times smaller than our measured value, in order to generate the 
measured  values. Since some of our participants wore eyeglasses, our measured 
value of  probably errs towards being smaller than a typical ancient hominin value, 
which emphasizes the mismatch between our model and the data even further. Thus, 
as a general phenomenon, it is extremely unlikely that Acheulean handaxe size drifted 
as described by the ACE model.  
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Before fully accepting this conclusion, however, we should note some limitations of 
our analysis. First, the ACE model is potentially simplistic in its assumption that all of 
Acheulean evolution took place in independent lineages; incorporating empirical data 
on the amount of branching that occurred into the model may allow it to make more 
realistic predictions. Second, although large, the comparative handaxe dataset used 
here is not exhaustive in terms of regional or temporal coverage and provides only a 
broad guide to how Acheulean handaxe size variation compares to the ACE model. 
While our data suggest that at its broadest scale Acheulean handaxe size variation 
does not conform to the ACE model, this does not rule out more localized instances of 
such drift. Indeed, regionally-specific trends of temporal change in handaxe size have 
been suggested previously (e.g. Gilead, 1970; Baskaran, 1986; Rajaguru, 1985), 
including geographically-localised instances of cultural drift that represent deviations 
from wider patterns due to situationally-specific circumstances (e.g. in India: Lycett 
& Bae, 2010). Recent analyses have emphasized how spatial and temporal factors 
might affect cultural patterning under neutral conditions (e.g. Lycett & von Cramon-
Taubadel, 2008; Hamilton & Buchanan, 2009; Premo, 2012; Pérez-Losada & Fort, 
2011). Given these factors, an important future extension of this study may therefore 
be to incorporate more explicit geographical parameters into the copying error model 
(e.g. spatial factors) and compare these revised models against artefactual data with 
high temporal and spatial resolution. 
 
Assuming that Acheulean handaxe size does broadly deviate from the ACE model, we 
see three possible explanations for this deviation. Firstly, concepts of appropriate 
limits for handaxe size may have been stabilised by functionally-related cultural 
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selection: for example, by the need to fit into tool users’ hands, a highly plausible 
selective pressure (Crompton & Gowlett, 1993; Gowlett, 2006). Secondly, handaxe 
size may have drifted in a way that stabilized variation: some models of this for 
quantitative traits were given by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). A third 
explanation for the suggested deviation from the ACE model might be due to the 
possibility that firm concepts of handaxe size (opposed to handaxe production 
methods leading to their essential and distinctive shape properties) may not strictly 
have been socially transmitted at all. An alternative possibility here is that as 
functional handheld tools, individuals gained an intuitive sense of what a ‘good sized’ 
handaxe was via their own empirical engagement with material properties and their 
various outcomes during usage. This idea resembles a hypothesis proposed by Tennie 
& Hedwig (2009), who noted that some traits in great ape cultural traditions might 
have been fostered by stimulus enhancement of the trait’s raw materials. This may 
also mean that (somewhat like shoes or other items of clothing) what is an ‘optimally-
sized’ handaxe may vary somewhat from individual to individual depending on their 
own physical size, strength, etc., in turn leading to patterns of variation in handaxe 
size that deviate from the ACE model. We note, however, that within any socially-
mediated context of observation and learning about handaxe production and usage, 
some notion of suitable size parameters is also likely to have been inducted in novice 
handaxe producers. Of course, some combination of these causes is also possible. 
Each of these explanations suggests a number of promising directions for further 
research. 
 
In conclusion, we have provided a theoretical reformulation and novel experimental 
test of the ACE model of cultural mutation, in which artifacts change purely due to 
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imperceptible differences between a copied artifact and the original, and which has 
been proposed as a null model for the cultural evolution of artifacts in the material 
record. Our experimental test supports the prediction that ACE causes artifact size 
variation to increase exponentially. However, it did not fully support the prediction 
that mean artifact size should remain unchanged, instead finding that the initial size of 
the to-be-copied artifact may bias the eventual copied artifact size. This suggests that 
the ACE model needs to be revised to incorporate this priming or biasing effect, and 
that future empirical work might seek to test this effect by comparing reductive and 
additive technologies. Finally, having established experimentally the validity of the 
ACE prediction concerning artifact size variation, we apply this prediction to an 
actual empirical dataset, showing that Acheulean handaxes do not fit the expectation 
of the ACE model, and we suggest potential alternative explanations for this 
deviation. 
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Chapter 4. 
Cultural differences and cumulative culture: parameterizing the differences between 
human and nonhuman culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter was co-authored with Stephen J. Lycett and Alex Mesoudi. It is currently 
being prepared for submission to Journal of Theoretical Biology.  
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Abstract: 
Diverse species exhibit population-specific profiles of socially learned traits, 
from songbird dialects to primate tool-use behaviours. However, only humans appear 
to possess cumulative culture, in which cultural traits increase in complexity over 
successive generations. Theoretically, it is currently unclear how cognitive and 
demographic factors give rise to these phenomena, and how to explain the difference 
between cumulative and non-cumulative cultural regimes. Here, we address this by 
constructing and analysing cultural evolutionary models of both phenomena that 
replicate empirically attestable levels of cultural variation and complexity in 
chimpanzees and humans. In our model of cultural differences, we find that realistic 
cultural variation between populations can be maintained even when individuals in 
different populations invent the same traits and migration between populations is 
frequent. Our model of cumulative culture indicates that both the accuracy of social 
learning and the number of cultural models interact to determine the complexity of a 
trait that can be maintained in a population. Combining these models creates two 
qualitatively distinct regimes, determined by the interaction of cognitive and 
demographic factors, in which there are either a few, simple traits, or many, complex 
traits, and suggest that these regimes correspond to the type of phenomena 
represented by nonhuman and human cultures, respectively.  
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4.1. Introduction 
Many animal species can learn socially (Galef and Laland 2005); examples include 
the transmission of food preferences in rats, shoaling routes and nest site locations in 
fish, and foraging locations in bees and ants (Helfman and Schultz 1984; Laland and 
Plotkin 1990; Leadbeater and Chittka 2007). Some of these species show cultural 
differences in the ‘trait-profiles’ of different populations, such as differences in the 
song dialects of different bird populations and in the presence or absence of various 
behaviours in different populations of chimpanzees and orangutans (Catchpole and 
Slater 2003; van Schaik et al. 2003; Whiten et al. 1999). Only humans unambiguously 
appear to also have cumulative culture (though there are possible reports in 
chimpanzees: Boesch et al. 2009), meaning cultural traits that depend on other traits 
(Boyd and Richerson 1996; Enquist et al. 2011; Tomasello et al. 1993); examples 
abound in technology, science, and mathematics (Basalla 1989; Hodgkin 2005; 
Longair 2003). One typical feature of cumulative culture is that traits become more 
complex than an individual could invent within their lifetime, because the trait has 
accumulated over successive generations (Boyd and Richerson 1996). 
 
Here we analyse models of both cultural differences and cumulative culture, and ask 
what causes the difference between human and nonhuman culture. There has been 
much work modelling the biological evolution of the capacity for social learning and 
culture, including various cultural transmission biases (Boyd and Richerson 1985; 
Kendal et al. 2009a; Rogers 1988; Wakano et al. 2004). We are interested in a 
different, related question: how do the dynamics of cultural (micro)evolution, caused 
by biologically-evolved cognitive capacities and social structures, lead to the 
phenomena of cultural differences and cumulative culture? While some models have 
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addressed this question, none suitably answer it in its broadest sense. Previous models 
of cultural differences have posited that different cultural traits are optimal in different 
ecologies and asked how cultural evolution can create and maintain cultural 
differences (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 1998). However, previous 
demonstrations of cultural differences in non-human species explicitly attempted to 
exclude behavioural variation attributable to ecological differences (van Schaik et al. 
2003; Whiten et al. 1999), raising the question of how cultural differences may arise 
purely due to the dynamics of cultural evolution. Previous models of cumulative 
culture have either not posited a strict dependence of more complex traits on simpler 
traits (Henrich 2004; Kobayashi and Aoki 2012; Mesoudi 2011b; Powell et al. 2009), 
have been specific to one or two species (Mesoudi 2011b; Pradhan et al. 2012), or 
have modeled culture at the population rather than the individual level (Enquist et al. 
2011). We are interested in understanding the question of how cumulative culture 
arises at the level of the individual, and in a species-general manner. 
 
In order to answer these questions, we build on previous models by Strimling et al 
(2009b) and Enquist et al (2010), which are elegant, simple, and tractable. Using these 
previous models as a basis for our own provides direct continuity with past work on 
this topic and ensures that we begin from a rigorous starting point; yet we also go 
beyond these existing models to address novel questions concerning cultural 
differences and cumulative culture.  In Strimling et al’s model, individuals are born, 
learn some of the cultural traits known by another individual, possibly invent new 
cultural traits, and eventually die. Traits are independent of each other, have identical 
cultural fitness, and have no effect on biological fitness. These are simplifying 
assumptions, probably unrealistic for some traits (e.g. foraging behaviours), but 
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possibly good approximations for many others (e.g. social customs or self-medication 
behaviours). Strimling et al showed how the number of different traits found in the 
population and the number of traits known by each individual increased as a function 
of population size, individuals' social learning accuracy, and individuals' 
innovativeness. 
 
Enquist et al (2010) showed that stable cultural traditions could never emerge if a trait 
is learnt from a single cultural model (e.g. one biological parent), assuming that the 
accuracy of social learning is not perfect. They further showed that neither 
independent invention, multiple learning trials, nor biological fitness benefits change 
this result significantly. They then showed that learning from multiple cultural models 
allows stable traditions to emerge, and derived the stable population frequency of a 
trait as a function of the accuracy of social learning and the number of cultural 
models. 
 
We extend these models to analyse cultural differences and cumulative culture. To 
Strimling et al’s model we add multiple populations that interact through migration, 
allowing a comparison of different populations’ trait profiles. To Enquist et al’s we 
add a linear succession of complexity levels to the trait, simulating the accumulation 
of cultural knowledge over successive generations. Finally, we combine these models 
and ask what features cause the appearance of these two different phenomena. 
 
4.2. Cultural differences 
Strimling et al's (2009b) model contains three stages. First, one of the N individuals in 
the population is picked at random, dies, and is replaced by a naïve individual. 
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Second, the naive individual picks one other individual at random and independently 
learns every trait that individual knows with probability a per trait (0 < 𝑎 < 1). 
Third, the individual invents a random number of new traits with expectation μ. To 
this we add a fourth stage, in which the individual migrates to another population with 
probability 𝑚
2
 (0 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 2). There are p such populations in the metapopulation, and 
the individual is equally likely to migrate to any of them. When the individual 
migrates, it swaps population memberships with a randomly chosen member of its 
target population, so that the size of each population remains constant. Because each 
migration event involves two individuals and the target population is picked at 
random, the expected number of individuals who migrate away from any given 
population in one timestep is 𝑚
2
+ 𝑚2 (𝑝−1)
𝑝−1
= 𝑚; this is why m is halved above. Since 
individuals can only migrate if they were ‘born’ in the current generation, this 
corresponds to ‘young’ individuals migrating. 
 
In order to model multiple populations of such learners, we must also decide which 
traits individuals invent. Strimling et al do not specify this, assuming only that 
individuals always invent traits that are currently unknown in the population. 
Lehmann et al (2011), using a similar model, assume that there are a very large 
number of traits, tending towards infinity, and individuals invent a random trait 
chosen from this set. However, clearly, a number of different populations in which 
individuals know only a small number of traits which were invented by picking at 
random from a very large set will tend to be completely dissimilar in the composition 
of their trait-profiles, and strikes us as unrealistic. Thus, we assume instead that there 
are infinitely many traits which are invented in a fixed sequence that is the same in all 
populations. We use the simplest possible sequence, in which traits are labeled by the 
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natural numbers and invented in the order 1, 2, 3, etc. Individuals always invent the 
first trait in the sequence that is not currently known by any individual in their 
population. This represents an idealized situation in which individuals' physical and 
cognitive predispositions and the nature of their physical and social environments 
create a clear ranking in the 'obviousness' of traits; for example, technologies for 
foraging easily-visible food resources may be invented before technologies for 
foraging hard-to-find foods, and foraging technologies in general may be invented 
before social or symbolic behaviours that are less important for survival. While this 
situation is clearly idealized, it is more realistic than assuming random draws from a 
large set of traits, and it is simple enough to analyse. Note that these traits are not 
cumulative; later traits do not build on earlier traits, and an individual can socially 
learn any set of traits irrespective of the traits’ position in the sequence. A trait may 
also be lost from the population and later re-invented without affecting any other 
traits. 
 
Fig. 4.1 shows the time course and end result of one simulation of the model. (A 
graphic illustrating an end result of the model is available in Appendix E, Figure E1.) 
Fig. 4.1a shows that the number of different traits known in each population, called S 
by Strimling et al, hovers around the expected value they derived. Fig. 4.1b shows the 
trait-profiles present in each population at the end of the simulation. Intuitively, one 
expects that if all populations invent the same traits in the same order, different 
populations will have identical trait profiles. However, the trait-profiles in Fig. 4.1b 
clearly show variation between populations. To quantify this variation we define s, the 
cultural similarity between two populations, in the same way as Enquist et al (2011): 
𝑠 = |𝑋⋂𝑌||𝑋⋃𝑌|, where X is the set of traits known in the first population and Y is the set 
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known in the second. Thus, s is the proportion of all traits known in either population 
that are known in both populations. To compare more than two populations we define 
?̅? to be the mean similarity between every possible combination of populations in a 
metapopulation. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. One simulation of the cultural differences model. (a) Time series of the number of 
traits S known in each population. The initial part of the simulation is not shown. The dashed 
line shows the exact expected value derived by Strimling et al (2009b). (b) Trait-profiles of 
each population at the end of the simulation, with grey cells marking the presence of a given 
trait in a given population and white cells marking its absence. The average similarity ?̅? 
between the populations is 0.71. Parameter values: N = 100, a = 0.9, μ = 0.1, m = 0, p = 5. 
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Fig. 4.2 shows how the mean similarity between populations ?̅? increases with 
population size N (in a decelerating way) and accuracy of social learning a (in an 
accelerating way). Fig. 4.2c shows how ?̅? varies across the parameter space created by 
N and a, demonstrating that no realistic parameter values generate complete inter-
population homogeneity. The reason that the assumption of a fixed sequence of traits 
does not lead to complete population homogeneity is trait loss. Since Enquist et al’s 
model (2010), in which individuals learn from one cultural model, is in effect 
contained within Strimling et al's model, it is clear that traits must eventually be lost 
because of imperfect social learning. We show in Appendix F that in the absence of 
migration, the probability that a trait will spread beyond its inventor is 
𝑎1 + 𝑎. 
Since a must be less than 1, this probability is always less than 1 2� . In other words, 
most newly invented traits die out with their inventor, even with high fidelity cultural 
transmission. This feature of the model accords reasonably with evidence on 
chimpanzee (P. t. schweinfurhii) inventions documented at Mahale, Tanzania, where 
approximately 43% of innovations documented over a 30-year period did not spread 
socially (Nishida et al. 2009). In the model, this frequent loss of traits is balanced by 
the re-invention of traits that have been lost, and this dynamic creates the moderate 
dissimilarity between population trait-profiles. 
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Figure 4.2. The effect of (a) the population size N, (b) the accuracy of social learning a, and 
(c) both, on the mean similarity between populations ?̅?. Panel (c) shows the value of ?̅? on a 
contour plot in an analogous way to a geographical map showing the height of a mountain at 
various points in space. All panels show the value found after 2000 timesteps, averaged over 
1500 simulations with parameter values μ = 0.1, p = 5, and m = 0; in (a) a = 0.9 and in (b) N = 
50. 
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We now analyse the effects of migration. Fig. 4.3 shows how the mean number of 
different traits known in a population 𝑆̅ and the mean similarity between populations ?̅? 
increase with m. We show values from simulations with m ranging from 0 (no 
migration) to 0.5 (half of all individuals migrate); the latter may be realistic in both 
human bands (Hill et al. 2011), and in chimpanzees, where one sex disperses. As 
expected, migration makes populations more similar in their trait-profiles, but even 
frequent migration does not completely homogenize them. Migration also increases 
the total number of traits known, because migrants can bring traits that have not been 
invented in the target population; this resembles the effect found by (Powell et al. 
2009), but not as pronounced. A possible empirical example of this is the introduction 
of ant-fishing into the Kasekela chimpanzee (P. t. schweinfurthii) community by a 
female immigrant from the Mitumba community (Gombe NP, Tanzania: O’Malley et 
al 2012). However, this is likely only to occur in specific circumstances, such as when 
the migrants are relatively older individuals and are thus preferred over younger 
individuals as cultural models (Biro et al., 2003). 
 
 84 
 
Figure 4.3. The effect of the migration rate m on (a) the mean number of different traits across 
all populations 𝑆̅ and (b) the mean similarity between populations ?̅?. Both panels show the 
value found after 2000 timesteps, averaged over 2000 simulations with parameter values N = 
50, a = 0.9, μ = 0.1, and p = 5. 
 
To compare the results shown in Fig. 4.3b with empirical data, we calculated the 
values of ?̅? from data reported on chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) (Whiten et al. 1999) 
and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) (van Schaik et al. 2003), ignoring all comparisons 
involving traits thought to be absent for ecological reasons or insufficient observation. 
The values of ?̅? were approximately 0.46 and 0.32, respectively. Note that these 
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values probably underestimate the true values, because these studies only included 
traits that the investigators suspected a priori might vary between populations. With 
this in mind, Figs. 4.2c and 4.3 show that the model produces realistic between-
population variability. 
 
4.3. Cumulative culture 
Enquist et al's (2010) model tracked the dynamics of a single cultural trait in a 
population. The model has two parameters, which we rename for consistency with 
Strimling et al's model: a, the accuracy of social learning, and n, the number of 
cultural models. As above, both parameters are assumed to be constant across all 
individuals. We extend their model in the following way. The population consists of 
N individuals, and as above, in each time step a randomly chosen individual dies and 
is replaced by a naive individual. The individual then randomly picks n other 
individuals from the population to be its cultural models. The individual attempts to 
learn the trait from each of the n models in turn. Whether this learning is successful 
depends on whether or not the models carry the trait and on a. Finally, the individual 
innovates with probability μ. 
 
The trait has an infinite number of complexity levels. Learning any given level is 
dependent on having learnt all previous levels. The levels represent cumulative 
improvements that can be made to the basic, level 1 trait. Thus, they may roughly 
correspond to Oswalt's (1976) 'techno-units', or to successive modifications to a 
technology or social practice; plausible definitions and examples of different levels 
are given by Pradhan et al (2012). In our model, individuals learn these levels as 
follows: for each cultural model, the individual learns the first level of the trait that it 
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does not already know with probability a, and moves on to the next level if 
successful, which it again learns with probability a, and so on. Thus the probability of 
a naive individual learning a given level l from a model who knows at least l levels of 
the trait is 𝑎𝑙. After social learning, each individual has a probability μ of improving 
its knowledge of the trait by one level through innovation. 
 
Thus, in our model ‘cumulative culture’ is implemented as a strictly ‘ladder-like’, 
hierarchical process, as opposed to the more ‘fluid’ implementation in previous 
models such as that of Henrich (2004), in which individuals can jump from any level 
of a trait to any other. To our knowledge our model is the first general model of 
cumulative culture using ‘ladder-like’ traits. Additionally, innovation in our model 
takes place at the individual level, rather than the population level, allowing us to 
observe the growth of cumulative culture at the population level as a 
macroevolutionary process created by microevolutionary individual innovation 
events. 
 
We are interested in understanding how 𝑙,̅ the mean level that a population maintains, 
depends on the accuracy of social learning a, the number of cultural models n, and the 
innovativeness μ. In each simulation of the model the population begins completely 
unknowledgeable. Fig. 4.4 shows the time course and end result of one simulation of 
the model. (A graphic illustrating a time course of the model is available in Appendix 
E, Figure E2.) In Fig. 4.4a we see that the mean level of the trait in the population 
initially rises and then stabilizes; Fig. 4.4b shows the resulting distribution of levels 
amongst the individuals of the population. 
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Figure 4.4. One simulation of the cumulative culture model. (a) Time series of the mean level 
𝑙 ̅known in the population. (b) The distribution of levels in the population at the end of the 
simulation. Parameter values: N = 100, a = 0.7, n = 3, μ = 0.1. 
 
Fig. 4.5 shows the effects of a and n on the mean level 𝑙 ̅of the trait that is maintained 
in the population. The mean level 𝑙 ̅increases linearly with n (Fig. 4.5a), and non-
linearly with a (Fig. 4.5b). When varying the innovativeness μ in simulations, we 
found that increasing μ from 0.1 to 1 increases 𝑙 ̅by ≈ 3 regardless of the values of the 
other parameters; thus, the effects of a and n are much stronger than the effect of μ. 
Fig. 4.5c shows how 𝑙 ̅varies across the parameter space created by a and n. Enquist et 
al showed that only if 𝑎𝑛 > 1 could the trait be stably maintained in the population 
through social learning in their model. Since the trait in their model corresponds to the 
basic level 1 trait of ours, this result clearly applies here too. Much of the parameter 
space features realistic levels of accumulation; compare the values of 𝑙 ̅shown in Fig. 
4.5c to the mean techno-unit values of 3-7 found by an empirical analysis of the 
complexity of marine foraging technology in a number of Oceanic human populations 
(Kline and Boyd 2010). However, there are clearly many different combinations of a 
and n that will maintain a given mean level 𝑙 ̅in the population; thus, observing a 
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given level of accumulation in a population does not allow us to completely identify 
the values of a and n for that population. Note that in the simulations shown in Figs. 
4.4 and 4.5 the population size N = 100, as opposed to N = 50 in the simulations 
shown in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3, corresponding to the increase in the effective population 
size among later hominin species and Homo sapiens compared to non-human great 
apes. 
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Figure 4.5. The effect of (a) the number of cultural models n, (b) the accuracy of social 
learning a, and (c) both, on the mean trait level 𝑙 ̅maintained in the population. All panels 
show the value found after 10000 timesteps, averaged over 20 simulations, with N = 100 and 
μ = 0.1; in (a) a = 0.9 and in (b) n = 3. 
 
4.4 Combined model 
we note that our two models can be combined. Imagine that each trait in the first 
model comes in the infinite number of levels described in the second model, and that 
instead of choosing only one cultural model, naive individuals choose n cultural 
models, learn from them, and then both invent new traits and improve existing ones. 
The structure of the traits and trait levels in this model is shown in Fig. 4.6. As shown 
in the figure, the difference between traits and trait levels corresponds to the 
distinction drawn by Dean et al. (2013) between cultural ‘accumulation’ and 
‘cumulative culture’: in the first, it is the number of cultural traits that increases, and 
in the second their quality. The combined model then simulates the dynamics of 
independent cumulative traits within and between populations that interact by 
migration. To fully analyse the model, a choice must be made as to how individuals 
innovate cumulative traits; whether, for example, there is a fixed expected number of 
improvements per individual, or whether more knowledgeable individuals make on 
average more improvements. Unfortunately there is little empirical evidence on this 
question. 
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Figure 4.6. A schematic illustration of the structure of the traits and trait levels for one 
hypothetical individual in the combined model. In this example, the individual knows trait 
number 1 to level 5, trait number 2 to level 4, trait number 3 only at the first level, does not 
know trait number 4, and knows trait number 5 to level 2. 
 
Without deciding this one way or another, we can still make useful statements about 
the combined model. Consider the expected number of different traits S in a 
population. If 𝑛 = 1, Strimling et al (2009b) derived an analytical approximation for 
S, which shows that, for realistic but high values of these parameters, say N = 100, a = 
0.9, and μ = 0.5, 𝑆 ≈ 133 traits. On the other hand, if 𝑛 > 1, no analytical 
approximation for S is known, but we can approximate S by following Strimling et al 
and noting that 𝑆 = 𝜇𝑁𝑇, where T is the expected lifetime, in generations, of a newly 
invented trait. We conducted simulations that showed that even for very small values 
of the parameters which satisfy the criterion 𝑎𝑛 > 1, say N = 30, a = 0.65, and n = 2, 
𝑇 ≈ 100, and that T increases very rapidly with increases in the parameters. 
 91 
Assuming additionally a low value for innovativeness, e.g. μ = 0.1, 𝑆 ≈ 300 traits (a 
simulation showing this is given in Appendix E, Figure E3) and rises very quickly 
into the thousands and tens of thousands of traits with increases in the parameters. 
Moreover, the condition 𝑎𝑛 > 1 is also the condition for cumulative culture to arise, 
as noted above. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
Our models give results that mimic the phenomena of between-population cultural 
differences and cumulative culture in reasonably realistic ways. In our model of 
cultural differences we find that realistic differences between populations are 
maintained despite assuming that all individuals invent the same traits in the same 
order, and despite frequent migration between populations. This occurs because traits 
die out with non-negligible frequency, and most traits do not spread beyond their 
inventor. In our model of cumulative culture, we find that the accuracy of social 
learning, a cognitive factor, and the number of cultural models, a demographic factor, 
interact to determine the cumulative level of a trait that a population can stably 
maintain, and that large portions of the parameter space feature realistic levels of 
accumulation. 
 
Our first result implies that cultural differences between animal populations do not 
necessarily reflect ecological or genetic differences, which has been a matter of some 
debate (Laland and Galef 2009). Moreover, it is clear from our results that cultural 
differences between animal populations also need not be caused by model biases or 
conformity within differing populations. Furthermore, the time series in Fig. 4.1a 
imply that phenomena such as chimpanzee cultures have inherent historical 
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dimensions (Lycett 2010), which have indeed begun to be investigated using 
archaeological (Haslam et al. 2009) and phylogenetic (Lycett et al. 2007) methods. 
Our second result implies that neither cognitive nor demographic factors are the sole 
explanation for the evolution of cumulative culture, which again has been the topic of 
some discussion (Powell et al. 2009). The dependence of cumulative culture on two 
different factors may help to explain its rarity in nature. Moreover, the strong 
influence of these two factors and the weak influence of innovativeness per se on 
cumulative culture may cast doubt on the ‘cognitive niche’ explanation of hominin 
success put forward by Pinker (2010), in which rapid innovation is key. The model 
instead lends support to the ‘cultural niche’ interpretation of Boyd et al. (2011), in 
which cumulative culture is the main driving force behind successful hominin 
adaptation to changing and varied environmental conditions.  
 
Finally, we note that our analysis of the combined model shows that the model has 
two qualitative regimes, with the threshold created by the interaction of both cognitive 
and demographic factors. When 𝑎𝑛 < 1, the number of traits known in the population 
is relatively low and there is no cumulative culture. When 𝑎𝑛 > 1, many traits are 
known in the population and there can be cumulative culture. We suggest that these 
regimes correspond qualitatively to nonhuman and human cultures, respectively. 
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Chapter 5. 
The 'fundamental theorem of cultural selection' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under review at Biology and Philosophy.  
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Abstract: 
R. A. Fisher's 'Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection' gave a 
mathematical basis to the theory of biological evolution by natural selection. In this 
chapter, I give a new interpretation to an existing mathematical theorem called the 
growth-rate theorem, allowing it to be understood as the 'fundamental theorem of 
cultural selection’. I explain the meaning of this theorem and argue that it fulfills a 
similar function to Fisher's Theorem, providing a mathematical basis for the theory of 
cultural evolution by cultural selection. I also argue that it can give conceptual clarity 
to, and shed light on, the concept of cultural selection and the processes of cultural 
evolution.   
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5.1. Introduction 
In 1930, R. A. Fisher gave what he called 'The Fundamental Theorem of Natural 
Selection' (Fisher, 1930). His purpose in doing so was, in his words, to "state the 
principle of Natural Selection in the form of a rigorous mathematical theorem, by 
which the rate of improvement of any species of organisms in relation to its 
environment is determined by its present condition" (ibid, p.22). The aim of this 
chapter is to give a similar theorem for the theory of cultural evolution. Specifically, I 
propose that a similar 'fundamental theorem of cultural selection' can be found by 
giving a new, cultural interpretation of an existing mathematical theorem called the 
growth-rate theorem. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 2, I summarise the meaning, 
history, and usefulness of Fisher's Fundamental Theorem. In section 3, I summarise 
the theory of cultural evolution, present the 'fundamental theorem of cultural 
selection', and explain its interpretation and usefulness. Finally, in section 4, I 
conclude and discuss the connection between the theorem and Price's equation. 
 
5.2. Fisher's Fundamental Theorem 
Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection was given in Chapter II of his 
1930 book The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (Fisher, 1930). Fisher stated the 
Theorem as follows: "The rate of fitness of any organism at any time is equal to its 
genetic variance in fitness at that time." (ibid, p.35; italics his). His verbal statement 
is somewhat cryptic and the Theorem is easier to understand in the paraphrased words 
of Edwards (1994, p.450): "The rate of increase in the mean fitness of any organism at 
any time ascribable to natural selection acting through changes in gene frequencies is 
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exactly equal to its genic variance in fitness at that time". A mathematical statement 
may also be given using the notation of Edwards  (1994): �𝑤 = 𝑣, where w is the 
normalized mean fitness and v is the variance in that fitness. 
 
Before describing the Theorem in more detail, it is worth saying a little about the 
history of the reception of the Theorem. From its publication in 1930 until 1972, it 
was either ignored or misunderstood by geneticists, who (partly because of Fisher's 
unclear wording) thought that the Theorem referred to the total change in mean fitness 
rather than the partial change in mean fitness due to natural selection. In 1972 G. R. 
Price wrote a paper arguing that the true meaning of the Theorem had been 
misunderstood (Price, 1972), and since then it has been discussed by Edwards (1994; 
2002), Ewens (1989; 1992; 2011), Frank & Slatkin (1992), Lessard (1997), and 
Okasha (2008), among others. My description of it that follows is heavily indebted to 
these authors. 
 
The essence of the Theorem is to identify the equality between the rate of change of 
the mean fitness of a population and the 'genic', or additive genetic, variance in fitness 
amongst individuals in that population. The Theorem rapidly became famous because 
it implied that mean fitness always increases (because a variance is never negative). 
However, the Theorem is only concerned with that part of the total change in mean 
fitness that is "ascribable to natural selection acting through changes in gene 
frequencies" (from the above quote from Edwards, 1994). In addition to natural 
selection, a number of other factors will interact to determine the mean fitness of a 
population at a given time: mutation, migration, drift, and environmental change (both 
of the natural and social environments), as well as the effects of genetic combinations 
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through epistasis and dominance. The Theorem is not concerned with any of these 
factors and instead only quantifies the increase in mean fitness due to natural selection 
that would take place if every gene in the population were to retain the same fitness 
after selection as it had before selection. 
 
While mutation, migration, drift, and environmental change are commonly thought to 
be separate evolutionary factors from natural selection, the fact that the Theorem does 
not take account of genetic effects like dominance and epistasis may seem strange, as 
these are commonly thought to be integral parts of the action of selection. However, 
in Fisher's derivation the Theorem is based on the average effect of each gene, and it 
must be understood from the gene's ‘point of view', which was later to be influentially 
propounded by Dawkins (1976). From the metaphorical point of view of a particular 
gene (strictly speaking, allele), the other genes (alleles) present in 'its' genome are part 
of the environment it finds itself in. Thus the effects of dominance and epistasis 
constitute part of what can be called the 'genetic environment', and can be partitioned 
from the effect of natural selection on the frequencies of genes (alleles). 
 
It is important to understand that, since it does not incorporate the effects of mutation, 
migration, drift, or changes in the natural, social, or genetic environment, the 
Theorem is not useful for predicting evolution; in almost all circumstances, these 
factors will have important effects on mean fitness. Rather, it quantifies the extent to 
which the population, viewed as a population of genes, becomes adapted by natural 
selection to the environment it was previously in. Moreover, organisms tend to be 
highly adapted to their environments and have relatively stable population sizes, and 
Fisher expressed the view that "for the majority of organisms, therefore, the physical 
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environment may be regarded as constantly deteriorating" (Fisher, 1930, p.41). This 
deterioration of the environment, along with the effects of the other factors not 
included, generally counterbalances the adaptive, fitness-increasing effect of natural 
selection. 
 
What, then, is the value of Fisher's Theorem? It is a clear mathematical statement of 
how evolution by natural selection brings about adaptedness. Though of little practical 
value, it has great conceptual value, because it formalises the workings of natural 
selection. 
 
An example of its conceptual value is given by Frank & Slatkin (1992). In birds, 
higher clutch sizes frequently increase fitness, and birds have intraspecies variation 
for clutch size, yet often clutch sizes remain stable over time (Cooke et al., 1990). 
They suggest that the partition of total fitness change into fitness change caused by 
natural selection and fitness change caused by the change of the environment, which 
arises naturally from Fisher’s Theorem, can explain the stability of total fitness, 
because selection for increased clutch size is exactly counterbalanced by increased 
competition from other birds in the population. They also argue that Fisher’s Theorem 
may explain many other similar ‘Red Queen’-like situations in evolution. 
 
5.3. The 'fundamental theorem of cultural selection' 
5.3.1 Background 
Before describing the 'fundamental theorem of cultural selection', I will give some 
background on the theory of cultural evolution. The basic principle of this theory is 
that the 'Darwinian algorithm' (Dennett, 1995) of natural selection is an important 
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process not only in biological change but also in cultural change. 'Culture', in this 
usage, means any information that is transferred via social learning from one 
organism to another. The idea that natural selection acts on cultural traits goes back to 
Darwin himself (Darwin, 1871), and has been expounded by many scholars since then 
(James, 1880; Campbell, 1965; Dawkins, 1976; Popper, 1979; Skinner, 1981; Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Hull, 1988; Dennett, 1995). A 
comprehensive survey of evidence for the existence of natural selection on cultural 
traits, or 'cultural selection', is given by Mesoudi et al. (2004), and recent work in the 
field is summarised in Richerson & Christiansen (2013). 
 
In order to derive the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection, Fisher had to adapt 
his Theorem to the complexities of genetic inheritance. However, cultural traits do not 
reproduce by copying a set of particles in a way analogous to organisms reproducing 
by copying a set of genes. Therefore, the mathematics of cultural selection can be 
described by a simple theorem, in which genes do not figure, known as the 'growth-
rate theorem', given by Li (1955) and Edwards (1994). The theorem I present here as 
the 'fundamental theorem of cultural selection' is mathematically almost identical to 
the growth-rate theorem; what is new is the interpretation of the mathematics to 
represent cultural selection – the differential reproduction and survival of cultural 
traits caused by their own characteristics. 
 
Before presenting the theorem I will briefly discuss three previous authors who have 
combined Fisher's Theorem with cultural evolution in some way. Firstly, Bonner 
(1980), in the course of a monograph on the evolution of social learning in animals, 
briefly refers to an equivalent of Fisher's Theorem for cultural evolution created by 
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his colleague Henry Horn (ibid, p.17). However, this was never independently 
published or described by Horn. Secondly, Findlay (1990) derived a 'Fundamental 
Theorem of Natural Selection in Biocultural Populations'; however, Findlay 
interpreted Fisher's Theorem in the incorrect way that Price (1972) had shown was not 
Fisher's intention, and thus his theorem has a different meaning to the theorem I 
present below (though I should make clear that Findlay’s Theorem is, to my 
knowledge, entirely mathematically valid). Finally, Okasha (2007) has investigated a 
modification of Fisher’s Theorem created by considering cultural inheritance in 
addition to genetic inheritance. Okasha's result is thus concerned with the effect of 
cultural inheritance on biological evolution, rather than cultural evolution per se (and 
again I emphasise that Okasha’s result is, to my knowledge, entirely mathematically 
valid). 
 
5.3.2 The theorem 
I will now present the theorem. Imagine a human population. Each individual in the 
population knows a number of cultural traits, which all together make up a 
‘population of traits’. Each trait falls into one of a set number of trait-types. There are 
k trait-types, each of which have absolute fitness 𝑓𝑖 (with 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘). Absolute 
fitnesses have the following meaning: if there are 𝑛𝑖 traits of a trait-type i present in 
the population before selection, there will be 𝑛𝑖 × 𝑓𝑖 traits of that type present in the 
population after selection. From these absolute fitnesses, a relative fitness 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 𝑓̅⁄  
can be calculated for each trait type. Finally, let w denote the list (i.e. the vector) of all 
these relative fitnesses, 𝑤�  denote the mean fitness of the population of traits, ∆ denote 
the change during one time interval (which may be taken to represent any arbitrary 
length of time), and Var() denote the variance of a vector. Then the theorem is 
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∆𝑤� = Var(𝒘); 
or in words, ‘the change in the mean relative fitness of the population of traits due to 
cultural selection is equal to the variance in relative fitness in that population before 
selection’. An extended proof is given in Appendix G. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. An example of cultural selection illustrating the theorem. Circles represent human 
individuals. Blue and red circles represent people who know one of two different traits, while 
empty circles represent people who do not know either of these traits. 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the meaning of the theorem. The panels depict a human 
population where each individual (a circle) knows either a trait of the 'blue' trait-type, 
the 'red' trait-type, or no trait. The absolute fitness of blue traits is 2, and that of the 
red is 1. The fitness of a trait includes the property of being remembered or retained 
by an individual through the given time interval, and so the blue traits spread to an 
additional individual in the time interval while the red traits are simply remembered 
by their current individuals. In the left panel we see the population before selection, 
and in the right panel after selection. Before selection, the mean absolute fitness, 𝑓,̅ 
was 3×2 + 2×1
5
= 8
5
, and thus the relative fitness of the blue traits, 𝑤blue, was 28 5⁄ = 108  
and the relative fitness of red traits, 𝑤red, was 18 5⁄ = 58, while the mean relative fitness, 
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𝑤� , was by definition 1 (this can be checked arithmetically: 
3×108  + 2×58
5
= 1). After 
selection, we calculate the mean fitness of the population using the same fitnesses as 
before selection. Thus, the mean relative fitness after selection, 𝑤� ′ becomes 
6×108  + 2×58
8
= 1 3
32
. The theorem claims that the increase in relative fitness, ∆𝑤� = 𝑤� ′ −
𝑤� = 1 3
32
− 1 = 3
32
, is equal to the variance in relative fitnesses before selection, and 
indeed, Var(𝒘) = 3×�108  − 1�2 + 2×�58 − 1�2
5
= 3
32
. 
 
The intuition behind the theorem can be understood from thinking about Figure 5.1. If 
there had been more blue traits to start with, then the initial variance in fitness would 
have been greater, and there also would have been more blue traits after selection, 
increasing the mean fitness of the population of traits after selection. In general, the 
more variation is present in the fitnesses of the traits in the population, the more scope 
there is for the traits with higher fitness to outcompete those with lower fitness, 
thereby increasing the mean fitness of the population after selection. 
 
Though the above example is simplified, for expository purposes, the theorem also 
applies in more complicated cases in which people know more than one cultural trait, 
and/or cultural traits have multiple other cultural traits as ‘parents’ i.e. ‘blending 
transmission’. In order to incorporate such multi-‘parental’ transmission, fitness must 
be calculated as follows: if there are x traits of one trait-type, all of which contribute 
to the reproduction of n traits of their type in other individuals, then their absolute 
fitness is 𝑛
𝑥
. 
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5.3.3 Interpretation 
In order to interpret the theorem as describing cultural selection, two important 
definitions must be made. Firstly, fitness must be understood to measure the number 
of copies of a trait present after reproduction whose reproduction was causally 
influenced by some characteristic of that trait. This causal link is what distinguishes 
cultural selection from cultural drift. Secondly, cultural traits must be understood to 
be ideational; that is, residing in the mind of an individual, and expressed and 
transmitted through physical means such as movement, speech, writing, and artifacts. 
This follows the consensus in the field of cultural evolution (Mesoudi et al., 2004) in 
viewing the information stored within the individual as the true locus of a cultural trait 
and the influence of that trait on the individual’s behavior and environment as the 
expression of the trait. 
 
Because of these definitions, the theorem encompasses a number of different cultural 
evolutionary processes which are not always considered together, and shows that 
these processes all fall under the umbrella of ‘cultural selection’. These processes 
include: 
• the retentiveness of cultural traits, meaning their propensity to be remembered 
or retained by the individuals who have them; 
• content bias (Richerson & Boyd, 2005), where a learner’s psychological 
preferences for and judgements of the distinctive characteristics of a particular 
trait cause that learner to adopt that trait; 
• frequency-dependent bias (Richerson & Boyd, 2005), where a learner uses 
information about the frequency of different traits within a human population 
to decide which trait to adopt; 
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• some forms of model bias (Richerson & Boyd, 2005), where a learner decides 
to adopt a trait because of a preference for learning from people who have 
some specified characteristic (e.g. prestige or success in a given domain): 
namely, only those forms in which the trait that is learnt from the model was 
causally influential on the model’s relevant characteristic (e.g. if having the 
trait contributed to their success in the relevant domain); 
• the natural selection of cultural traits through the differential survival or 
fertility of the individuals that carry them due to them carrying them (e.g. the 
growth of pro-natalist religious movements like the Old Order Amish); and, 
• cultural group selection, in which the differential survival of human groups 
with different cultural traits causes the spread of that trait (possible examples 
include the spread of monogamous marriage, co-operative practices, and 
military innovations: see Boyd & Richerson, 2010 and Henrich et al., 2012). 
Each of these processes are a kind of cultural selection because they are processes in 
which the characteristics of the cultural traits involved, which may include their 
memorability, appeal or 'catchiness', popularity, and usefulness – whether through 
achieving a particular goal in life, increasing survival or fertility, or leading to an 
increased probability of survival for the cultural group – causally influence their own 
reproduction and/or survival. This can be reflected formally in recursive models of 
cultural evolution by the effect of the selective process multiplying the variance 
amongst the cultural traits. 
 
Classing frequency-dependent bias as cultural selection deserves additional comment. 
Intuitively speaking, frequency-dependent bias appears not to be like the other 
processes, since in this process the ‘content’ of the cultural trait is by definition 
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irrelevant to that trait’s fitness, and its fitness is entirely determined by the frequencies 
of the various trait-types in the human population. However, from an individual trait’s 
‘point of view’, being an instance of, say, the most frequent trait-type in a population 
of conformers is a characteristic that causes it to reproduce in that population. Since 
this reproduction is causally influenced by a characteristic of the trait – its being an 
instance of a particular trait-type, the most frequent one – this is an example of 
cultural selection. 
 
The theorem, analogously to Fisher's Theorem, quantifies the extent to which these 
processes of cultural selection adapt the population of cultural traits to the social and 
cultural environment that they were in prior to selection. The above discussion should 
make clear that while the theorem shows that the action of cultural selection is always 
to increase the fitness of a population of cultural traits, it is neutral with regard to the 
effect of the traits on the biological fitness of the human population. Whether traits 
tend to work to the benefit or detriment of their carriers’ biological fitness is a 
separate question not addressed by the theorem. 
 
In addition, also like Fisher's Theorem, the theorem is not concerned with a large 
number of other factors that interact to determine the mean fitness of the population of 
traits. In the cultural case, these factors include innovation (which includes guided 
variation [Boyd & Richerson, 1985] and mutation [Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981]), 
‘diffusion’ (as used by Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981), the cultural equivalent of 
migration, in which a trait is transmitted into the population from an individual 
outside the population), change in the social or cultural environments, drift (Neiman, 
1995), and the transmission of traits from non-ideational sources (see below). 
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These factors must be understood with some care. The category of innovation 
includes processes of blending or continuous inheritance, in which multiple traits 
from multiple-trait types interact to produce a new trait of a new trait-type. From the 
point of view of the parent traits, this new trait is a mutation, or innovation, and thus 
does not count towards their fitness. The trait's ‘point of view' also illuminates the 
meaning of the environment in cultural selection: the ‘social environment’ of a trait 
consists of the (mind of the) individual that has the trait and the set of other 
individuals in the population with which that individual is in contact, while the 
‘cultural environment’ consists of the other cultural traits that the individual and its 
contacts have. Since the reproduction of a trait must by definition be causally 
influenced by its own characteristics in order to count as cultural selection, the 
category of cultural drift includes some forms of model bias (e.g. some forms of 
prestige or success bias) in which a trait is copied because of some characteristic of a 
model individual that was not causally influenced by that trait. Lastly, because of the 
definition of traits as being ideational, the transmission of traits from non-ideational 
sources – i.e. not from individuals, whether directly or indirectly – is not encompassed 
by the theorem. For example, a letter from one individual to another in the population 
may allow a trait from the writer to be transmitted to the reader, and this reproduction 
may therefore count towards that trait’s fitness value. However, if an individual reads 
a book by a long-dead author and thereby learns a novel trait, this cannot count as an 
example of the reproduction of a trait, since there was no trait in the population to 
which this reproduction could rightly be ascribed. However, this latter event is an 
example of cultural niche construction, an important separate process in its own right 
(Kendal, 2011), and indeed, the modelling framework of cultural niche construction is 
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better suited to modelling the transmission of traits from ideational sources such as 
books, as in this framework there is a clear distinction between the living population 
of individuals who carry cultural traits and the non-living, niche constructed 
ecological environment which can separately influence cultural evolution and allow 
traits to be ‘reborn’ after the death of all their living carriers. 
 
What, then, is the use of the theorem? I suggest that, like Fisher's Theorem, it has 
conceptual rather than practical value. It mathematicizes the notion of cultural 
selection, or the differential reproduction and survival of cultural traits, upon which 
the theory of cultural evolution rests. This rigorous statement brings, in my view, 
conceptual clarity to the topic, and as outlined above, illuminates the relationships and 
distinctions between a number of different processes in cultural evolutionary theory. 
 
The literature on cultural evolution is currently divided on the use of the term ‘cultural 
selection’. Some scholars, such as Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) use the term 
habitually, but distinguish it from the differential survival or reproduction of cultural 
traits through their effects on the biological fitness of their carriers. Other scholars, 
such as Boyd & Richerson (1985), acknowledge the fact that a Darwinian selective 
process operates on culture but prefer to discuss more specific processes such as 
content, frequency-dependent, and model biases. Yet other scholars, such as Sperber 
& Claidière (2008), have questioned the relative importance of cultural selection in 
cultural evolution. Therefore I propose that the theorem given above may be used as 
an objective criterion for the community of researchers in cultural evolution to build a 
taxonomy or classification of processes in cultural evolution, of which my discussion 
above provides a ‘first draft’. 
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5.4. Discussion  
In this chapter I have described a new interpretation of the growth-rate theorem 
(Edwards, 1994) which may bear the title of the 'fundamental theorem of cultural 
selection'. I have suggested that this theorem can play a similar role in the theory of 
cultural evolution that Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection plays in 
the theory of biological evolution. Moreover, I have discussed some ways in which 
the theorem gives precision to discussions on the processes that make up the theory of 
cultural evolution. 
 
Lastly, I will deal with the connection between Fisher's Theorem, the 'fundamental 
theorem of cultural selection', and the Price equation. The Price equation (Price, 1970) 
is a well-known mathematical equation which can famously be applied to any sort of 
selection, whether evolutionary or not (Price, 1995). Previous authors (e.g. Rice, 
2004; Frank, 2012) have noted that Fisher's Fundamental Theorem can be derived 
from Price's equation in a very simple way (essentially, by letting the abstract 'trait' in 
the Price equation be fitness itself, and ignoring the term representing changes in the 
trait due to transmission). However, this derivation does not make the specific causal 
links between genes and their average effect that Fisher's (1930) derivation does, and 
thus also does not invite the idea of viewing natural selection from the 'gene's point of 
view'. Similarly, while it is possible to derive the 'fundamental theorem of cultural 
selection' using the Price equation and produce a mathematically identical result, I 
feel that the concrete interpretation I have given in this chapter is more illuminating 
with regard to cultural selection. 
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General conclusions and future directions 
 
This thesis has presented four novel experimental and theoretical models of cultural 
evolution, divided equally between experimental and theoretical work. In my first 
experimental chapter, I showed with a novel task that group size can increase the rate 
of cultural accumulation. This lends support to the models of cumulative culture 
surveyed in Chapter 1, which have attempted to explain puzzling phenomena such as 
the loss of technology in Tasmania and the rise of technology in the Paleolithic. In my 
second experimental chapter, I showed that Acheulean handaxe evolution cannot be 
fully explained by cultural mutation due to perceptual error. This provides a first 
example of a transmission chain experiment examining the effects of perception, 
rather than memory or other cognitive processes, on cultural transmission. 
 
In my first theoretical chapter, I constructed two realistic models of cultural evolution 
and combined them to produce a model which qualitatively represented the difference 
between human and nonhuman culture. This extends previously analysed models to 
encompass the interesting phenomenon of cultural differences, as well as providing a 
detailed model for the cumulative gap between human and non-human cultures. 
Finally in the second theoretical chapter, I offered a mathematical formalisation of the 
process of cultural selection and argued that this representation can bring theoretical 
unity to the field of cultural evolution. I believe this theorem will prove useful to 
discussions amongst both theoreticians and philosophers interested in cultural 
evolution. 
 
There are many future directions in cultural evolution highlighted by the findings 
reported here. The experimental examination of cumulative culture in Chapter 2 can 
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be conducted with tasks in different domains, and greater effort devoted to linking 
experimental (‘toy’) tasks to real-life examples of cumulative technological trait-
complexes. For example, is cultural accumulation more likely to occur, or faster, with 
real-life technologies that can be combined easily and additively, as can jigsaw puzzle 
solutions, compared to real-life technologies that cannot, as represented by paper 
aeroplane designs? Such work will require detailed historical and/or ethnographic 
study of the process of invention and innovation. One specific potential type of 
cumulative culture which may be fruitfully investigated is academic research itself; 
references to earlier works in papers and books, for example, could allow a clear 
picture of the ‘tree’ of cultural traits which make up academic thought, including 
novel concepts, definitions and terminology, empirical observations, etc.  
 
Experimental tasks of cumulative cultural evolution should also be conducted with 
different groups of participants, with different designs, and with different incentive 
structures. One important question to understand is, to what extent does collaboration, 
or ‘skill-pooling’, aid the development of cumulative culture? It may prove interesting 
to link this literature with the literature on cooperation: cumulative cultural evolution 
can only proceed if traits can be freely copied from previous individuals and built 
upon, yet in an individually-competitive situation those individuals would have no 
incentive to share their knowledge. Cultural group selection (see Chapter 1) may 
provide a solution to this dilemma. Indeed, this might have contemporary implications 
for the patent system and recent phenomena such as patent trolling, in which 
companies buy patent rights solely in order to sue inventors who reinvent a 
technology independently. In addition, the hypothesis that population size affects 
cultural accumulation suggests looking for phenomena such as technological loss in 
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the historical record during times of population decrease e.g. due to famine or plague, 
and technological gain during times of population increase e.g. due to medicinal 
advances and political changes. 
 
The perceptual experiments of Chapter 3 can easily be applied to other technologies, 
such as hunting spears, as well as artistic, non-functional objects such as beads (for 
example, red ochre beads), and the model analyzed therein provides quantitative 
predictions of the divergence caused by perceptual errors. This model provides a 
simple baseline against which to detect the signatures of non-random cultural 
evolutionary processes operating on past material culture, which can be tested in the 
empirical record. Since there are significant numbers of such artifacts, data on their 
metric measurements will provide valuable testing grounds for general cultural 
evolutionary theories of technological change such as this model. The additional 
advantage of such models is that they are based on well-established psychophysical 
principles, and these principles could be used to construct other models e.g. models 
dealing with other sensory domains. 
 
The models of Chapter 4 represent a first step towards combining individual-level 
models of cultural differences and cumulative culture with quantitative empirical data, 
which offers much promise for the future. An obvious extension is consider more 
complicated but realistic models, including models which explicitly track individuals’ 
ages, environmental variables, and spatial location. Additionally, in future models the 
functional value of traits may be directly modelled, individual heterogeneity may be 
taken into account, and the multi-level social structure of human communities (i.e. 
family groups within bands within tribes). Such more complicated models will present 
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analytical challenges which will have to be faced by more sophisticated 
computational and/or mathematical techniques. As noted in Chapter 1, one cultural 
evolutionary model, Bentley’s model of random copying, has been rephrased in pure 
mathematics by Eriksson et al. (2010) as a random walk on the integer partitions of a 
given number (the population size). Investigating mathematical models of cultural 
evolution in such ways may unearth deeper insights into cultural evolutionary 
processes. 
 
Finally, the model of Chapter 5 offers a unifying conception of cultural selection that 
may focus the debate between researchers in support of, and researchers opposed to 
the theory of cultural evolution as a whole, as well as clear up conceptual 
disagreemen t within the field of cultural evolution over the use of terms such as 
‘content bias’ or ‘cultural mutation’. In particular, the term ‘cultural selection’ has not 
yet come to be used in a consistent way by different researchers in the field; Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman (1981), for example, use it regularly, while Boyd & Richerson 
(1985) often use terms referring to more specific processes, such as content, model, 
and frequency-dependent biases. Since the field of cultural evolution is founded on 
the borrowing of Darwin’s concept of ‘natural selection’ from evolutionary biology, a 
coherent, precise, and widely-accepted definition of the term ‘cultural selection’ will 
be essential to the growth and wider acceptance of the field.  
 
As noted in the Introduction, cumulative cultural evolution has played a major role in 
allowing our species to more rapidly adapt to diverse environments and spread across 
the planet in an evolutionarily short time period. While the biological sciences have 
been successful in explaining the diversity and complexity of life on the planet, the 
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social sciences have been less successful in explaining the similar diversity and 
complexity of human culture. The field of cultural evolution offers a theoretically 
grounded path to understanding these complex phenomena (Mesoudi, 2011a). As in 
any science, a combination of empirical and theoretical work is essential, and more 
specifically, modelling is an essential tool to understand the complicated real world: 
for especially in social science, we will never be able to isolate every possible 
contributing factor in the ‘natural laboratory’ of the real world. In this thesis I have 
presented three modelling studies in which empirical and theoretical considerations 
are intertwined: in Chapter 2, by testing the empirical predictions of a theoretical 
model; in Chapter 3, by analysing a previously described theoretical model, deriving 
testable predictions, and then testing them empirically; and in Chapter 4, by 
introducing two new models, analysing them, and comparing their predictions with 
empirical evidence. The thesis is bookended by Chapter 1, which provides a review of 
the modelling literature that has accumulated so far in the years since the first books 
of Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) and Boyd & Richerson (1985), and by Chapter 5, 
which provides a mathematical and thus precise description of cultural selection 
which may be used as the foundation of an ‘ontology’ or classification of cultural 
evolutionary processes. I hope that these theoretical and experimental models will 
contribute to a more rigorous and productive science of cultural evolution. 
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Appendix A. 
Full data of the experiment presented in Chapter 2. 
Condition Replicate Place Value 
Individual 1 1 34 
Individual 1 2 27 
Individual 1 3 33 
Individual 1 4 55 
Individual 2 1 57 
Individual 2 2 18 
Individual 2 3 26 
Individual 2 4 44 
Individual 3 1 32 
Individual 3 2 54 
Individual 3 3 58 
Individual 3 4 7 
Individual 4 1 42 
Individual 4 2 60 
Individual 4 3 36 
Individual 4 4 42 
Individual 5 1 49 
Individual 5 2 25 
Individual 5 3 37 
Individual 5 4 54 
Group 1 1 41 
Group 1 1 37 
Group 1 1 47 
Group 1 2 70 
Group 1 2 38 
Group 1 2 48 
Group 1 3 33 
Group 1 3 47 
Group 1 3 79 
Group 1 4 36 
Group 1 4 61 
Group 1 4 55 
Group 2 1 69 
Group 2 1 57 
Group 2 1 55 
Group 2 2 66 
Group 2 2 57 
Group 2 2 88 
Group 2 3 82 
Group 2 3 67 
Group 2 3 27 
Group 2 4 80 
Group 2 4 98 
Group 2 4 95 
Group 3 1 50 
Group 3 1 23 
Group 3 1 32 
Group 3 2 56 
Group 3 2 28 
Group 3 2 29 
Group 3 3 50 
Group 3 3 48 
Group 3 3 57 
Group 3 4 100 
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Group 3 4 43 
Group 3 4 52 
Group 4 1 52 
Group 4 1 38 
Group 4 1 38 
Group 4 2 31 
Group 4 2 56 
Group 4 2 59 
Group 4 3 52 
Group 4 3 62 
Group 4 3 36 
Group 4 4 41 
Group 4 4 62 
Group 4 4 44 
Group 5 1 44 
Group 5 1 23 
Group 5 1 10 
Group 5 2 2 
Group 5 2 48 
Group 5 2 26 
Group 5 3 40 
Group 5 3 36 
Group 5 3 51 
Group 5 4 57 
Group 5 4 25 
Group 5 4 25 
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Appendix B. 
Data on the number of distinct pieces completed in the experiment of Chapter 2. 
1 2 3 4 5 
70 85 65 75 58 
73 90 73 82 56 
83 83 84 83 72 
71 100 100 81 67 
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Appendix C. 
Full data from the experiment presented in Chapter 3. 
Chain Place Scale Condition 
1 1 1.02038709420869 Larger 
1 2 1.0326150299997 Larger 
1 3 1.04772486646248 Larger 
1 4 1.10165309929125 Larger 
1 5 1.13836955677379 Larger 
1 6 1.16557555412524 Larger 
1 7 1.1734441130667 Larger 
1 8 1.16424782215465 Larger 
1 9 1.1175095427542 Larger 
1 10 1.14666033565637 Larger 
2 1 0.972554037845496 Larger 
2 2 1.0210288215406 Larger 
2 3 1.0523103277033 Larger 
2 4 1.03128671079693 Larger 
2 5 1.02769543364554 Larger 
2 6 1.03333861749822 Larger 
2 7 1.08660210349343 Larger 
2 8 1.12853423979788 Larger 
2 9 1.16029492742365 Larger 
2 10 1.15654415801077 Larger 
3 1 1.01128640469638 Larger 
3 2 1.02038216145833 Larger 
3 3 1.005907475327 Larger 
3 4 1.02419012728604 Larger 
3 5 1.03035489076557 Larger 
3 6 1.06349181574041 Larger 
3 7 1.03353416581587 Larger 
3 8 1.03351419992158 Larger 
3 9 1.11402349761038 Larger 
3 10 1.13261926177054 Larger 
4 1 0.999413274591619 Larger 
4 2 1.02908705647786 Larger 
4 3 1.04626782596473 Larger 
4 4 1.08015112304687 Larger 
4 5 1.0968727944114 Larger 
4 6 1.12883067460494 Larger 
4 7 1.14300645955404 Larger 
4 8 1.10868508726178 Larger 
4 9 1.12277854225852 Larger 
4 10 1.12090985199899 Larger 
5 1 1.04846994665897 Larger 
5 2 1.04755480402166 Larger 
5 3 1.06182642526338 Larger 
5 4 1.07441997181286 Larger 
5 5 1.04841063620827 Larger 
5 6 1.0768203420928 Larger 
5 7 1.05295275971384 Larger 
5 8 1.06249434315075 Larger 
5 9 1.06790791921905 Larger 
5 10 1.05270107199929 Larger 
6 1 1.00206486280037 Larger 
6 2 1.01800234430487 Larger 
6 3 0.98306032631614 Larger 
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6 4 1.0275256060976 Larger 
6 5 1.02031298550692 Larger 
6 6 1.03769494074041 Larger 
6 7 1.03478567504883 Larger 
6 8 1.03109292417584 Larger 
6 9 0.971202053185665 Larger 
6 10 0.957236967144591 Larger 
7 1 0.990721181233724 Larger 
7 2 1.00602680090702 Larger 
7 3 0.982293107466264 Larger 
7 4 0.99028251879143 Larger 
7 5 0.9766861558394 Larger 
7 6 0.975408925836737 Larger 
7 7 1.01513453720555 Larger 
7 8 1.00634555053711 Larger 
7 9 1.01141442131274 Larger 
7 10 0.981850451845111 Larger 
8 1 1.06026333063299 Larger 
8 2 1.02405071836529 Larger 
8 3 0.975863854610559 Larger 
8 4 0.977514623006185 Larger 
8 5 0.996105278246331 Larger 
8 6 1.00616738429214 Larger 
8 7 1.00957333096591 Larger 
8 8 1.02966395337654 Larger 
8 9 1.01141759236654 Larger 
8 10 1.00191629305753 Larger 
9 1 1.06414740175189 Larger 
9 2 1.07585387536251 Larger 
9 3 1.01507757568359 Larger 
9 4 0.97480366562352 Larger 
9 5 0.970190134684245 Larger 
9 6 1.00631971232096 Larger 
9 7 0.96892993441495 Larger 
9 8 0.970977143258759 Larger 
9 9 0.98800981278853 Larger 
9 10 0.979791498357599 Larger 
10 1 1.00103380052971 Larger 
10 2 0.955388242779356 Larger 
10 3 0.95582807968602 Larger 
10 4 0.973411103219697 Larger 
10 5 0.989152801513672 Larger 
10 6 1.00120304084547 Larger 
10 7 1.00986964832653 Larger 
10 8 1.02838155573065 Larger 
10 9 1.04031599287553 Larger 
10 10 1.11623513146603 Larger 
1 1 0.97385258437648 Smaller 
1 2 0.997147732821378 Smaller 
1 3 0.964152213356712 Smaller 
1 4 0.875708351828835 Smaller 
1 5 0.875285896994851 Smaller 
1 6 0.862015095566258 Smaller 
1 7 0.877776055075906 Smaller 
1 8 0.936521236072887 Smaller 
1 9 0.943303356748639 Smaller 
1 10 0.972686693596117 Smaller 
2 1 1.03762623457475 Smaller 
2 2 1.03166665002072 Smaller 
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2 3 1.0191037569913 Smaller 
2 4 1.00111894919656 Smaller 
2 5 1.0255529757413 Smaller 
2 6 0.958790372443922 Smaller 
2 7 0.967180217396129 Smaller 
2 8 0.890521988377427 Smaller 
2 9 0.847049248435281 Smaller 
2 10 0.850743995897698 Smaller 
3 1 0.964989958792022 Smaller 
3 2 0.996467952843868 Smaller 
3 3 1.06643361409505 Smaller 
3 4 0.998179382324219 Smaller 
3 5 1.05207120675752 Smaller 
3 6 1.06384803078391 Smaller 
3 7 1.05651397057736 Smaller 
3 8 1.03382966105143 Smaller 
3 9 0.994979789040305 Smaller 
3 10 0.95821494362571 Smaller 
4 1 1.03432129183683 Smaller 
4 2 1.03308939615885 Smaller 
4 3 1.03048842736446 Smaller 
4 4 1.07907695793383 Smaller 
4 5 1.04069898570668 Smaller 
4 6 1.03484040508848 Smaller 
4 7 1.03225141583067 Smaller 
4 8 1.01949097789418 Smaller 
4 9 0.99645644309304 Smaller 
4 10 0.995590862852154 Smaller 
5 1 1.00389597020005 Smaller 
5 2 1.03363329060872 Smaller 
5 3 0.932629707105232 Smaller 
5 4 0.887737568248402 Smaller 
5 5 0.915218977494673 Smaller 
5 6 0.883711915449663 Smaller 
5 7 0.902923979788116 Smaller 
5 8 0.919528674501361 Smaller 
5 9 0.884367853800456 Smaller 
5 10 0.824908128680605 Smaller 
6 1 0.991549883293383 Smaller 
6 2 1.00257998287317 Smaller 
6 3 0.963844738584576 Smaller 
6 4 0.954531882083777 Smaller 
6 5 0.884840516986269 Smaller 
6 6 0.868377697568951 Smaller 
6 7 0.8593986825654 Smaller 
6 8 0.845253903475675 Smaller 
6 9 0.799507870298444 Smaller 
6 10 0.862050388220585 Smaller 
7 1 1.03932709387577 Smaller 
7 2 0.988408308549361 Smaller 
7 3 1.00367963386304 Smaller 
7 4 0.884898359356505 Smaller 
7 5 0.928645747791637 Smaller 
7 6 0.928948935768821 Smaller 
7 7 0.928821682554303 Smaller 
7 8 0.898043316927823 Smaller 
7 9 0.91960971254291 Smaller 
7 10 0.920930162834399 Smaller 
8 1 0.988010400020715 Smaller 
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8 2 0.996553806189335 Smaller 
8 3 1.03400101540305 Smaller 
8 4 1.07371928636955 Smaller 
8 5 1.06886921830611 Smaller 
8 6 1.09395847852302 Smaller 
8 7 1.11203606900302 Smaller 
8 8 1.10370019068862 Smaller 
8 9 1.15381023984967 Smaller 
8 10 1.18244004035719 Smaller 
9 1 0.959803465409712 Smaller 
9 2 0.994103990959399 Smaller 
9 3 1.0129216114391 Smaller 
9 4 0.985320994059245 Smaller 
9 5 0.958314714373964 Smaller 
9 6 0.961129788023053 Smaller 
9 7 1.01340243715228 Smaller 
9 8 1.03424448186701 Smaller 
9 9 1.07442032415217 Smaller 
9 10 1.12353842070608 Smaller 
10 1 1.0063673955744 Smaller 
10 2 0.903933725530451 Smaller 
10 3 0.89808254403779 Smaller 
10 4 0.893241754242868 Smaller 
10 5 0.888963239265211 Smaller 
10 6 0.977966498172644 Smaller 
10 7 0.963611724853516 Smaller 
10 8 1.00986025261156 Smaller 
10 9 1.03085955810547 Smaller 
10 10 1.00977909712358 Smaller 
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Appendix D. 
R source code for the simulation presented in Chapter 3. 
conditions <- list ( 
 "larger"  = list ("sd" = 0.0269, "final.mean" = 10.64647, "comparison" = `>=`, 
"final.variance" = 0.6143204), 
 "smaller" = list ("sd" = 0.0399, "final.mean" = 9.700883, "comparison" = `<=`, 
"final.variance" = 1.33803)) 
simulation <- function (condition) { 
 values <- replicate (10000, replicate (10, prod (rnorm (10, 1, condition$sd)) * 
10)) 
 mean.p.value <- length (which (condition$comparison (colMeans (values), 
condition$final.mean))) / 10000 
 variance.p.value <- length (which (apply (values, 2, var) <= 
condition$final.variance)) / 10000 
 return (c ("mean p-value" = mean.p.value, "variance p-value" = 
variance.p.value))} 
print (sapply (conditions, simulation)) 
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Appendix E. 
Supplementary figures for Chapter 4. 
 
 
Figure E1. The end result of one simulation of the cultural differences model. Each rectangle 
represents one population, with numbered cells representing traits present in that population 
and coloured cells representing traits absent from that population. Parameter values: N = 100, 
a = 0.9, μ = 0.1, m = 0, p = 6. 
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Figure E2. The time course of one simulation of the cumulative culture model. The trait level 
corresponds to the number of dashed lines making up the star. The mean trait level at any 
timestep is equal to the trait level depicted by the closest star to the left of that timestep. 
Parameter values: N = 100, n = 3, a = 0.85, μ = 0.1. 
 
 
Figure E3. The number of traits known in the population in one simulation of the combined 
model. Parameter values: N = 30, n = 2, a = 0.7, μ = 0.1, m = 0, p = 1. 
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Appendix F. 
Proof of result in Chapter 4. 
 
Imagine, in Strimling et al’s model (i.e. with m = 0), that a focal individual has just 
invented a new trait. In the next timestep, one of three things can happen: the trait can 
be lost because the individual dies, the trait can continue to be known only by the 
inventor, or another individual can learn the trait. Let us denote the probabilities of 
these three events by 𝑝lost, 𝑝kept, and 𝑝copied. The trait will be lost if the inventor is 
randomly picked to die; thus, 
𝑝lost = 1𝑁. 
The trait will be learnt by another individual if the inventor does not die, and the 
individual randomly picks the inventor to learn from, and is successful at learning; 
thus, 
𝑝copied = �1 − 1𝑁� � 1𝑁−1� 𝑎 = 𝑎𝑁. 
Finally, 
𝑝kept = 1 − 𝑝lost − 𝑝copied = 1 − 1𝑁 − 𝑎𝑁 = 𝑁−𝑎−1𝑁 . 
 
What is the probability P(t) that the trait is learnt by another individual for the first 
time exactly t timesteps after it was invented? For this to happen, the trait must 
continue to be known only by the inventor for 𝑡 − 1 timesteps, and must then be 
learnt by another individual on the tth. Thus, 
𝑃(𝑡) = 𝑝kept𝑡−1 𝑝copied = �𝑁 − 𝑎 − 1𝑁 �𝑡−1 𝑎𝑁. 
Finally, what is the probability that the trait will ever spread beyond its inventor? This 
happens if P(t) ever happens, i.e. with probability 
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�𝑃(𝑡)∞
𝑡=1
= ��𝑁 − 𝑎 − 1
𝑁
�
𝑡−1 𝑎
𝑁
∞
𝑡=1
. 
Using the standard identity for infinite geometric series, this can be shown to be equal 
to 
𝑎
𝑎 + 1. 
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Appendix G. 
Proof of the theorem. 
 
Edwards (1994) gives a concise proof of the general growth-rate theorem. Here I give 
a more extended proof specific to cultural selection. 
 
Imagine a population of N traits, where each trait falls into one of k trait-types. There 
are 𝑛𝑖 traits of each trait-type, with 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘, and each trait-type makes up a 
proportion 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 𝑁⁄  of the population. Each trait of trait-type i has absolute fitness 
𝑓𝑖 and relative fitness 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 𝑓̅⁄ , where 𝑓 ̅is the mean absolute fitness of the 
population. The mean relative fitness 𝑤�  is thus 1
𝑁
∑𝑛𝑖𝑤𝑖 = 1𝑁 ∑𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖 𝑓̅⁄ =
1
𝑁
∑𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖
∑𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖
𝑁
� = 1 (where the summations, like all others here, are from 1 to k). 
Finally, let w represent the vector of the relative fitnesses of each trait. 
 
The theorem to be proved is that Δ𝑤� = Var(𝒘). Let a variable with an apostrophe 
denote the value of that variable after reproduction; then ∆𝑤� = 𝑤� ′ − 𝑤� = ∑𝑤𝑖′𝑝𝑖′ − 1. 
The point of the theorem, as discussed in the text, is that the mean fitness of the 
population after reproduction is calculated using the fitnesses of the traits before 
reproduction, thereby ignoring possible changes in fitness due to environmental 
change; thus, 𝑤𝑖′ = 𝑤𝑖. Also, note that 𝑝𝑖′  is equal to 𝑝𝑖𝑤𝑖 (to wit, 𝑝𝑖𝑤𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖𝑁 𝑓𝑖?̅? =
𝑛𝑖
𝑁
𝑓𝑖
∑𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖/𝑁 = 𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖∑𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖′∑𝑛𝑖′ = 𝑛𝑖′𝑁′ = 𝑝𝑖′ ). Thus, ∆𝑤� = ∑𝑤𝑖2𝑝𝑖 − 1. But this is exactly 
equal to Var(𝒘), because by definition Var(𝒘) = 𝔼(𝒘2) − 𝔼(𝒘)2 = ∑𝑤𝑖2𝑝𝑖 − 1. 
Therefore, the theorem is proved. 
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Fisher (1930) defined fitness in a different way, using organismal life and birth tables 
to define a ‘malthusian parameter’ m. The theorem could also be derived this way; 
however, as it is probably impossible to construct accurate survival and reproduction 
tables for cultural traits, I doubt this would be illuminating. 
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